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THE RIGHT TO REMAIN: COMMON LAW
PROTECTIONS FOR SECURITY OF TENURE
AN ESSAY IN HONOR OF JOHN OTIS CALMORE*
FLORENCE WAGMAN ROISMAN**

Security of tenure is a critically important human need. While
involuntary displacement can affect even conventional homeowners,
it most often is imposed upon renters and those who own
manufactured homes but lease the underlying land. Most such
Copyright © 2008 by Florence Wagman Roisman.
William F. Harvey Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis.
This essay is written for my friend and colleague, John Otis Calmore. While he and I have agreed
about many things, we have disagreed about the relative importance of mobility and equalization
remedies in the housing desegregation context. In appreciation for the values John has
emphasized, I have chosen to write about ways to protect people who want to stay where they are.
The choice of topic was influenced by Ishbel Dickens, Esquire, of Columbia Legal Services,
whose determination to protect her clients from displacement of their manufactured homes
illuminated the urgency of the topic.
For substantive suggestions and for inspiration, I am deeply indebted to participants in
the National Housing Law Project's Housing Justice Network, in particular, Gideon Anders, Ted
Fillette, Steve Fredrickson, Kenneth Goldman, and Richard Tenenbaum. I owe special thanks to
advocates who were so generous as to read and comment on an earlier draft of this Article: Julie
Becker, Elliott Berry, Paul Birnberg, Connie Deer, Ishbel Dickens, Fred Fuchs, Kenneth
Goldman, Barbara Goolsby, George Gould, Evan Lewis, Jack McCullough, Connie Pascale, Scott
Rosenberg, Andrew Scherer, William Wilen, and Eileen Yacknin. I also am grateful for
substantive help from Professors Lawrence Hammermesh, John Hill, Antony Page, George
Wright, and Sarah O'Farrell. For research assistance, I am grateful to Richard Humphrey of the
Ruth Lilly Law Library, Mary Ruth Deer, Christin Cogley (J.D. expected 2008), and Ravinder
Singh Deol (J.D. expected 2010). While I deeply appreciate all the help people have provided, I
alone am responsible for any errors or misjudgments in this Article.
As usually happens, the more research and thinking I did, and the more other people
commented on earlier drafts, the more depth and potential utility I saw in the material. Tenant
advocates made many points that I could not develop (for lack of time, if not ability and
knowledge). Since there was a deadline for submission of this Article to the North Carolina Law
Review, I was not able to explore the topic fully; indeed, as I submit it, I sense that I have only
begun to appreciate the potential of the use of the common law doctrines described here. I hope
that other academics and tenant advocates will expand and perfect ideas that are only sketched or
mentioned here, certainly including full consideration of both the theory and practice regarding
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contract law, the full range of uses to which the
covenant might be put in landlord-tenant law, and the use of foreign and international legal
standards regarding security of tenure and other tenant protections, see Florence Wagman
Roisman, Using Internationaland Foreign Human Rights Law in Public Interest Advocacy, 18
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. I (2007). It will be a great tribute to John Calmore to pursue these
possibilities.
*

**
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renters are not wealthy enough to obtain security of tenure by
agreement with the landowner, and therefore rely upon the
government to assure them some protection against arbitrary
terminations of occupancy by the landowner.
Some jurisdictions in the United States have acted legislatively
to require good cause for eviction, but in most states tenants and
owners of manufactured homes on rented sites must rely on the
common law for any such protection. The mid-century "revolution"
in tenants' rights stopped far short of protecting continued tenancy.
This Article arguesfor a renewed litigation effort to realize security
of tenure for such renters, by using either the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing that is commonly applied to contracts
and commercial leases or an implied covenant of security of tenure
(or good causefor termination).

Dr. King in 1967, preaching in Chicago: "But I hope I can live so
well that the preacher can get up and say he was faithful. That's all,
that's enough. That's the sermon I'd like to hear. 'Well done thy
good and faithful servant. You've been faithful; you've been
concerned about others.' "
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INTRODUCTION

Insecurity of tenure plagues millions of households in the United
States, particularly those who rent their homes and those who own

1. DAVID GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS 555 (1986). This epigraph is for John, who has
been, among many other admirable things, faithful.
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manufactured homes but rent the land upon which the homes are sited.While a relatively small set of wealthy renters have enough market power
to obtain the security they want from the landowner, and a relatively small
set of renters live in jurisdictions that have legislatively provided some
security of tenure, most renters in the United States are dependent upon the
common law for any rights they may have in this regard.3
In the mid-twentieth century, the judicial system took great strides in
developing such protections, but progress stalled short of establishing a
general principle of security of tenure for renters in the United States.
Curiously, the problem was not that courts rejected such advances or that
legal doctrine was inhospitable; rather, advocates simply stopped asking
the courts to continue the logical and natural doctrinal development that
already had begun.4 Aspects of security of tenure were litigated, and the
general principle of security of tenure was pursued legislatively, but the
general principle of security of tenure was not advanced in the courts.5
This Article calls for a renewed litigation approach to recognition of
the principle that renters-those who rent homes and those who rent the
land upon which their homes are sited-are entitled to security of tenure,
that is, that the landowner cannot terminate a tenancy absent a showing of
good cause. ('"Termination" for purposes of this Article means nonrenewal of a leasehold, as well as actions that cut off a tenancy during the
term or period of a lease. 6) Part I discusses the importance of security of
2. Some homeowners also suffer insecure tenure, particularly if they bear predatory or
other expensive mortgage loans, but this Article does not address homeowners' issues except for
owners of manufactured homes who rent the lots on which their homes are sited. See CAROLYN
L. CARTER ET AL., MANUFACTURED HOUSING COMMUNITY TENANTS: SHIFTING THE BALANCE
OF POWER 2 (2004) (stating there are about 2.3 million manufactured homes sited on rented lots
in manufactured housing communities in the United States).
3. The absence of protections in the United States contrasts sharply with strong security of
tenure for tenants in Europe and in other countries. In France, for example, most tenancies are
required to be for terms of three or six years and are renewed automatically; they can be
terminated at the end of a term only for one of three specified reasons. Jane Ball, Renting Homes:
Status and Security in the UK and France-A Comparison in the Light of the Law Commission's
Proposals,67 CONy. & PROP. LAW. (N.S.) 38, 50-52 (2003). Similar protections are provided in
other countries. See, e.g., Barreto v. Portugal, 334 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1995) (rejecting a
landowner's effort to reclaim property for his own use because the landowner had shown only
that his "living conditions would certainly be better and more comfortable in the house," but had
not shown the "real need" required by the case law).
4. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
6. The New Jersey and District of Columbia statutes apply to lease renewals, as does the
good cause protection in the Low Income Housing Tax Credit ("LIHTC") Program. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1-61.12 (West 2000); D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01(a) (2001) (specifying
that absent one of the ten reasons that constitute good cause, "no tenant shall be evicted from a
rental unit, notwithstanding the expiration of the tenant's lease or rental agreement."); Carter v.
Md. Mgmt. Co., 835 A.2d 158, 166 (Md. 2003) (holding that in the LIHTC program, a "tenancy
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tenure; Part II describes the development of protections for security of
tenure; Part III considers the relative advantages of legislative and judicial
protections for security of tenure; and Part IV reviews common law bases
for protecting security of tenure.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY OF TENURE
Security of tenure is one of the most important elements of the human
right to housing. As a housing rights expert has written, "Of all elements
of the right to housing, it is perhaps the right to security of tenure that
forms the most indispensable core element of the norm." 7
Security of tenure is fundamentally important because it is the basis
upon which residents build their lives. It enables people to make financial,
psychological, and emotional investments in their homes and
neighborhoods. It provides depth and continuity for children's school
attendance and for the religious, social, and employment experiences of
children and adults. Security of tenure enables tenants "to fully participate
in social and political life."8 All people have a strong interest in being

may not be terminated solely because of the expiration of [a] ... lease-that good cause is
required to evict even as a tenant holding over.. "). See generally Marc Jolin, Comment, Good
Cause Eviction and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 521-22 (2000)

(discussing the role of good-cause evictions in federal low-income housing programs).
There are, however, cases in which courts have declined to apply to renewals restrictions
legislatively imposed on other terminations. See, e.g., Frenchtown Villa v. Meadors, 324 N.W.2d
133, 135-36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (state statute prohibited retaliatory "termination" of a lease,
but court held that expiration of a fixed-term lease does not involve termination); Toms Point
Apartments v. Goudzward, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281, 285-87 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1972) (holding that when
the term of the lease has expired, the landlord is at liberty to refuse to renew, even where there
might have been limitations on the power to terminate during the term of the tenancy).
7. Scott Leckie, Where It Matters Most: Making InternationalHousing Rights Meaningful
at the National Level, in NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING RIGHTS 3, 35 (Scott Leckie ed.,

2003).
8. Deborah Hodges Bell, Providing Security of Tenure for Residential Tenants: Good
Faith as a Limitation on the Landlord's Right to Terminate, 19 GA. L. REV. 483, 532 (1985)

(arguing that "[a] tenant who fears loss of an interest as vital as his home may forego associations
or actions that are a normal part of self-determination and self-expression"). Professor Bell is
referring only to the landlord's "using the leasehold as a punitive or coercive device," which is
the only situation she is seeking to redress. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. I
believe, however, that Professor Bell's point applies more broadly, to protect tenants from
termination even where the landlord's reason is not punitive or coercive, but is economically
based. Even in that situation, security of tenure contributes to tenant participation in political
activity, if only because the tenant will not have to devote time, energy, and attention to securing
a new home and will be able to use those additional resources to engage in political activity,
among other things. People who are focused on keeping a roof over their families' heads and
bread on their families' tables will be substantially limited in their ability to participate in public
discussions. See Frank I. Michelman, Mr. Justice Brennan: A Property Teacher'sAppreciation,

15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 296, 298-99 (1980) (describing a vision in which "property would
both assure the necessary material foundation for political competence and provide a haven for
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treated fairly and in minimizing the impact of arbitrariness in their lives':
"In a society in which many individuals cannot realistically expect to
become homeowners, providing some security of tenure in rental housing is
an important step toward encouraging the sense of autonomy and stability
associated with the concept of home."'"
Involuntary displacement disrupts these educational, religious, social,
and employment connections." Residential instability is a major cause of

self-determination and self-expression"); id. at 304-05 (describing a view of property as "an
essential component of individual competence in social and political life, and assuring such
competence to all is an overriding public concern"). Professor William A. Fischel, speaking of
the security of tenure element of rent control:
It relates to community participation and to the potential community benefits of
improved housing. I resist the term 'positive externality,' but that's what I am talking
about-that nice housing benefits other neighborhoods. In big city neighborhoods that
are largely rental housing with absentee landlords, the landlords may have very little
incentive to use the public sector to upgrade neighboring housing. Someone else may
have to take their place. The someone else is obviously the tenants. What rent control
does is reallocate property rights from landlords to tenants, and there may be some
desirable consequences from it. The tenants may become more active in the community.
They may start behaving like suburban home owners. If you think that community
participation by tenants is a good thing, giving tenants some property rights in their own
units may, in fact, have some beneficial effects.
Timothy P. Terrell, Edited Transcript of Proceedings of the Liberty Fund, Inc. Seminar on the
Common Law History of Landlord-TenantLaw, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 623, 679 (1983). Professor
Donald M. McCloskey agreed, observing that "[tihere is a long history of landlord-tenant law in
agriculture [involving] ...the issue of the possible benefits of providing the tenant with security,
that is, some property interest in the land.").
9. See Sheila Crowley, The Affordable Housing Crisis: Residential Mobility of Poor
Families and School Mobility of Poor Children, 72 J. NEGRO EDUC. 22, 23-24 (2003) (stating
that "[hiousing that provides parents with a sense of control, choice, and well-being supports
good parenting. Parents whose housing limits their sense of choice and control are more
susceptible to relying on reactive and punitive parenting... " and that "[m]oves that are sudden
or unplanned and that are the result of family disruption, such as divorce, death, or eviction, carry
the most serious risk of emotional or psychological harm"); see also Karla Buerkle & Sandra L.
Christenson, A Family View of Mobility Among Low-Income Children, CTR. FOR URB. &
REGIONAL AFF. REP., Apr. 1999, at 7, 10, available at http://www.cura.umn.edu/reporter/99Apr/article2.pdf (discussing the importance of a sense of control over one's life); James A.
Thorson & Ruth Ellen Davis, Relocation of the InstitutionalizedAged, 56 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
131, 133-34 (2000) (discussing the importance of a sense of control in other contexts); John
Leland, As Owners Feel Mortgage Pain, So Do Renters, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at 1, 22
(" 'Renting a house, I should have rights like everybody else,' [one renter] said. 'I paid my rent.
That should entitle me to some security, right?' [The renter] added, 'I hate the fact that I'm put in
the position where I may not have a choice of where my kids go to school.' ").
10. Bell, supra note 8, at 541.
11. See Shana Pribesh & Douglas B. Downey, Why are Residential and School Moves
Associated with Poor School Performance?,36 DEMOGRAPHY 521, 521 (1999) (stating that from
a social capital perspective, "moving often damages, and sometimes completely severs, important
social ties that 'inhere in family relations and in community organization and that are useful for
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school instability, which has grave consequences not only for the transient
students, but also for the "stable students in a classroom afflicted with high
transience," who themselves experience "serious educational and social
disruptions."1 For elderly people, involuntary displacement can cause
illness, and even death. 3
Involuntary displacement also can cause significant economic loss,
most obviously for owners of manufactured housing who rent the sites on
which their homes are located, but also for those who rent both homes and
land. 4 Manufactured housing-often, inaccurately, referred to as "mobile
the cognitive or social development of a child or young person' " (quoting J.S. COLEMAN,
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 300 (1990)).

12. Todd Michael Franke & Chester Hartman, Student Mobility: How Some Children Get
Left Behind, 72 J. NEGRO EDUC. 1, 1 (2003); see also Buerkle & Christenson, supra note 9, at 89 (stating that the "findings strongly suggest that mobility negatively influences school
performance" and that "[t]he close relationship between mobility and limited quality housing
options for low-income families was clear," but urging consideration of multiple factors); Pribesh
& Downey, supra note 11, at 521 ("[M]ost studies show that students who experience a
residential move perform less well in school than students who do not move ....
");Russell W.
Rumberger, The Causes and Consequences of Student Mobility, 72 J. NEGRO EDUC. 6, 7 (2003)
(noting also that the "incidence of student mobility varies by race, ethnicity, and family income,"
with low-income students of color most likely to move). Many distinctions are important: for
example, involuntary moves probably are more damaging than voluntary moves, see Buerkle &
Christenson, supra note 9, at 9-10 and moves in single-parent households may be more damaging
than moves in two-parent households. Jack Tucker et al., "Moving On ": Residential Mobility
and Children's School Lives, 71 Soc. EDUC. 111, 114 (1998) (finding less harm for households in
which both biological parents are present). For a sampling of the literature on this point, see
generally Symposium, Student Mobility: How Some Children Get Left Behind, 72 J. NEGRO
EDUC. 1 (2003); Necati Engec, Relationship Between Mobility and Student Performance and
Behavior,99 J. EDUC. RES. 167, 167, 177 (2006) (showing that as student mobility increased, test
performance decreased and suspension rates increased).
13. For a thoughtful, sophisticated review of the issues, see generally F. Oswald & G.D.
Rowles, Beyond the Relocation Trauma in Old Age: New Trends in Elders' Residential
Decisions, in NEW DYNAMICS IN OLD AGE: INDIVIDUAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIETAL
PERSPECTIVES 127 (H.-W. Wahl et al. eds., 2006); see also O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing
Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 784 n.16 (1980) (referring to studies showing that involuntary transfers for
nursing home patients "may cause 'transfer trauma,' increasing the possibility of death or serious
illness for elderly, infirm patients"); Nicholas G. Castle, Relocation of the Elderly, 58 MED. CARE
REs. & REV. 291, 291 (2001), available at http://mcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/58/3/291
(reviewing seventy-eight prior studies in assessing consequences in the relocation of the elderly);
Stanislav V. Kasi, Physical and Mental Health Effects of Involuntary Relocation and
Institutionalization on the Elderly-A Review, 62 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 377, 377-78 (1972)
(calling for more research but noting that "the elderly appear to be the most vulnerable to the
adverse effects of the involuntary relocation" and that "[flor the elderly, who are a particularly
vulnerable group from the economic and socio-medical perspective," involuntary relocation
"could indeed have major health consequences"); James A. Thorson & Ruth Ellen Davis,
Relocation of the InstitutionalizedAged, 56 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 131, 137 (2000) (concluding
that "change, and the threat of change, is disrupting to people who are near the end of their lives).
14. See, e.g., Paul Sullivan, Note, Security of Tenure for the Residential Tenant: An
Analysis and Recommendations, 21 VT. L. REV. 1015, 1059 (1997) ("In some situations, it might
be more difficult for the renter of a conventional home to relocate. For example, the renter of a
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homes" or "trailers"-is in fact generally immobile, both because "the
homes are subject to damage during transportation" and because "moving a
home is a very expensive proposition and can easily cost $5,000 to $10,000
.... ,, For those who are renting their homes, too, "[r]elocation costs may
be significant, including costs of moving, possible temporary storage and
lodging, and additional deposits concerned with a new tenancy,"' 6 in
addition to the probable higher cost of replacement housing.
Loss of a home, especially for poor people living in tight housing
markets, may mean literal homelessness. 7 And homelessness may lead to
division of families, with children wrested from their parents' custody to be
8
institutionalized or placed into foster care.'

conventional home who places an above-ground pool, or a workshop with heavy equipment, on
the rental property could face higher relocation costs than a mobile home renter with easilymovable personal property."); E-mail from George Gould, Esq., to Florence Wagman Roisman,
William F. Harvey Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis (Aug. 27,
2007, 14:14 CST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (stating that in his "many years
of experience it is not uncommon for tenants to make financial investments for repairs and
improvements. Sometimes this is done in frustration to the [landlord] failing to adequately
respond or simply to improve the living conditions of their home"); see also Vivian S. Toy,
Sinking Your Money into a Rental, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007, § 11, at 1. While this story deals
with relatively affluent tenants, low-income tenants also might need to spend money on rented
homes, for appliances and repairs.
15. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992) ("Mobile homes are largely
immobile as a practical matter, because the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of
the value of the mobile home itself. They are generally placed permanently in parks; once in
place, only about I in every 100 mobile homes is ever moved."); CARTER ET AL., supra note 2, at
2 (adding that another barrier to moving a manufactured home is the "growing shortage of
manufactured housing communities to move to"); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Promoting the
Promise Manufactured Homes Provide for Affordable Housing, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. &
CMTY. DEV. L. 384, 389-90 (2004) (stating that "[e]xpenses of moving a [mobile home] may
exceed $10,000," "most older [mobile homes] 'simply cannot be moved' because of road
worthiness or strict age and condition restrictions on park admissions," and "it is very difficult for
[mobile home] owners to move their [mobile homes] if ... [mobile home] sites are limited due to
zoning restrictions and dwindling lot space. Furthermore, [mobile home] park owners generally
impose strict limitations on new [mobile home] admission .... ). With respect to the difficulty
and expense-or impossibility-of moving manufactured housing, see also J. Royce Fichtner,
Note, The Iowa Mobile Home Park Landlord-Tenant Relationship: Present Eviction Procedures
and Needed Reforms, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 181, 188-91 (2004).
16. Bell, supra note 8, at 534.
17. Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 461, 468 (2003) (stating that "forced displacement frequently results in
outright homelessness" and discussing other grave consequences of forced displacement).
18. See BETH HARRIS, DEFENDING THE RIGHT TO A HOME: THE POWER OF ANTI-POVERTY
LAWYERS 37-78 (2004) (discussing litigation challenging the use of homelessness as a basis for
destroying family integrity); see also Florence Wagman Roisman, How Litigation Can Lead To
Substantial Relief for Clients and Significant Social Change: A Review of Beth Harris,
Defending The Right to a Home: The Power of Anti-Poverty Lawyers, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
759, 759-60 (2005) (same).
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Furthermore, involuntary displacement can provoke intense
psychological harm. Marc Fried's classic study of displacement from the
West End of Boston identified "a grief response showing most of the
characteristics of grief and mourning for a lost person."19 The Fried study
noted that "relocation was a crisis with potential danger to mental health
for many people"20 :
Any severe loss may represent a disruption in one's relationship to
the past, to the present, and to the future. Losses generally bring
about fragmentation of routines, of relationships, and of
expectations, and frequently imply an alteration in the world of
physically available objects and spatially oriented action. It is a
disruption in that sense of continuity which is ordinarily a taken-forgranted framework for functioning in a universe which has temporal,
social, and spatial dimensions. From this point of view, the loss of
an important place represents a change in a potentially significant
component of the experience of continuity."
As Professor Deborah Bell has written:
Loss of a home can inflict on a tenant injury beyond economic harm
because a home 'represents things that money itself can't buyplace, position, relationship, roots, community, solidarity, status.'
These developments [toward legal recognition of the right to security
of tenure] reflect an underlying notion of 'the sanctity of the home'
as an aspect of an individual's personal integrity and dignity. The
movement toward security of tenure 'incorporates the normative
judgment that tenants should be allowed to become attached to
places and that the legal system should encourage them to do so.' In
today's society, a tenant makes an apartment his or her home in the
sense of a sanctuary needed for personhood.22
The strength and depth of one's attachment to one's home has been
recognized and celebrated in poetry23 and in prose24 and explored by

19. Marc Fried, Grievingfor a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in URBAN
RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359, 377 (James Q. Wilson, ed., 1966)
(describing the damaging consequences of displacement and relocation for residents of the West

End of Boston).
20. Id. at 361.
21. Id. at 361-62.
22. Bell, supra note 8, at 530 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional
Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1112 (1981) and Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991 (1982) (citations omitted). Professor Michelman is
writing about "property"; Professor Bell applies Professor Michelman's comments to housing).
23. See, e.g., ROBERT FROST, The Death of the Hired Man, in NORTH OF BOSTON: POEMS
7, 11 (Edward Connery Latham ed., Dodd, Mead & Co. 1977) (1914) (" 'Home is the place
where, when you have to go there,/ They have to take you in.' ").
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sociologists, psychologists, and planners. 25 Literature and social science
recognize in particular that forced, involuntary displacement from one's
home is a particularly wrenching experience 26 which can be especially
harmful to children. 27 The law, too, has acknowledged the power of the
connection to one's home, perhaps most famously in Blackstone's
observation that "the law of England has so particular and tender a regard
to the immunity of a man's house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never
24. GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS, 42 (Modern Library Paperback Ed. 2001)
(1860) ("We could never have loved the earth so well if we had had no childhood in it,-if it
were not the earth where the same flowers come up again every spring that we used to gather with
our tiny fingers as we sat lisping to ourselves on the grass-the same hips and haws on the
autumn hedgerows-the same red-breasts that we used to call 'God's birds,' because they did no
harm to the precious crops. What novelty is worth that sweet monotony where everything is
known, and loved because it is known?").
25. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 18; Megan J. Ballard, Legal Protections for Home
Dwellers: Caulking the Cracks To Preserve Occupancy, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 277, 279 (2006);
D. Benjamin Barros, Home As a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 255-56 (2006);
Lorna Fox, The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Challenge?, 29 J.L. &
SOC'Y 580, 598-600 (2002); Fried, supra note 19.
26. See, e.g., GEORGE ELIOT, ADAM BEDE 348-50 (Modern Library Paperback Ed. 2002)
(1859); see also Fried, supra note 19, at 359 (regarding the pain caused by involuntary
displacement); Patrick M. McFadden, The Right to Stay, 29 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2-5
(1996) (same). In Chapter XXXII of Adam Bede, the landlord, Squire Donnithorn, uses a threat
of eviction as he tries to persuade his tenant, Mr. Poyser, to agree to an arrangement that would
benefit the squire: "And I shall not forget your readiness to accommodate your landlord as well
as a neighbour. I know you will be glad to have your lease renewed for three years, when the
present one expires; otherwise, I daresay Thurle, who is a man of some capital, would be glad to
take both the farms .... But I don't want to part with an old tenant like you." ELIOT, supra, at
348. Mr. Poyser is "really alarmed at the possibility of their leaving the old place where he had
been bred and born-for he believed the old Squire had small spite enough for anything .....Id.
at 348. He says to his wife, who had spoken back to the squire: " 'But thee wotna like moving
from th' old place, ... and going into a strange parish, where thee know'st nobody. It'll be hard
upon us both, and upo' father too.' " Id. at 350. In Chapter XXXIII, the rector's mother observes
that "it will be a bad business if the old gentleman turns them out of the farm..." and the rector
responds " 'Oh, that must not be .... [Ilf
he should give them notice . . . , Arthur and I must
move heaven and earth to mollify him. Such old parishoners as they are must not go.' " Id. at
352.
27. See supra text accompanying notes 9, 11-12 (discussing the damage caused to children
by disruptions in school attendance and homelessness). The impact of displacement on children
suggests that some arguments for security of tenure might be based on laws protecting children,
including the International Covenant on the Rights of the Child. This Article will not explore that
further. For more on this subject, see generally Martha F. Davis, Human Rights in the Trenches:
Using InternationalHuman Rights Law in "Everyday" Legal Aid Cases, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 414 (2007); Connie de la Vega, Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 15
WHITTIER L. REV. 471, 480-86 (1994) (discussing ways in which international human rights law
can be used in U.S. litigation to secure education and welfare rights); Connie de laVega, Using
InternationalHuman Rights Law in Legal Services Cases, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1242, 1252
(1989) (discussing the "granting of ... parents' application under the Immigration and
Naturalization Act for suspension of deportation" in a case where "potential separation of
children with U.S. citizenship from their alien parents constituted sufficient hardship"); and
Roisman, supra note **,at 1.
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suffer it to be violated with impunity .... 28 More generally, the law
"recognizes that long-continued enjoyment of property in and of itself,
creates an entitlement to the property."29 As Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote:
A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long
time ... takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without
your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you
came by it. The law can ask no better justification than the deepest
instincts of man.3 °
Partly to vindicate these "deepest instincts of man," and partly "to
quiet all titles which are openly and consistently asserted,"'" AngloAmerican law allows even willful trespassers and converters to acquire title
to real and personal property by adverse possession-that is, possession
that is hostile, open, notorious, exclusive, actual, and continuous.32
In life and in literature, the strength of the bond between the resident
and the home is unrelated to the nature of the resident's tenure: a tenant
may have as powerful a connection to her home as a homeowner might
have. 33 The law, too, recognizes that the integrity of the home must be as
protected for a tenant as for a homeowner; the Fourth Amendment, for

28. 4 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 175 (Wayne
Morrison ed., Cavendish 2001) (1769); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1999)
(referring to Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b 195 (K.B.) (1604),
which made "the now-famous observation that 'the house of every one is to him as his castle and
fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose' ").
29. CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 125 (Casner et al. eds., 5th ed. 2004) (referring to any
property, not only one's home).
30. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897).
31. Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REv. 135, 135 (1918).
32. See Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for "Bad Faith" Adverse
Possession, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037, 1059 (2006) (discussing the rationales for the doctrine of
adverse possession, rejecting both of those mentioned in the text, and arguing that only bad faith
possessors should be capable of achieving title through adverse possession). In part also to
vindicate these "deepest instincts of man," the constitutional protection against deprivation of
property without due process of law has been extended to interests far beyond the traditional
understanding of "property." See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9
(1978) (utility services); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (disability benefits);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970) (public assistance benefits); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975) (public education). All of the reasons that support the requirement of a
showing of good cause to terminate these "new property" interests apply to termination of the
established property interests of tenants in their homes, even though the former termination is
effected by the government and the latter by private parties. The fact that the private parties use
the government-the judicial system-to effect the termination offers an independent basis for
requiring good cause for termination. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). This is yet
another area that is not explored in this Article but should be developed elsewhere.
33. See, e.g., ELIOT, supra note 26, at 348 (describing the Poysers' pain at the thought of
losing their tenancy). See generally Ballard, supra note 25, at 279-81.

2008]

RIGHT TO REMAIN

example, protects the "houses" of tenants (and even the encampments of
homeless people) as well as of homeowners.'
In a variety of situations, courts and legislatures have acted to protect
renters from displacement from their homes and have specified some of the
interests that are served by doing so. The New Jersey legislature, for
example, which created a state-wide requirement of good cause for tenancy
termination, including non-renewal, identified some of the personal
hardships caused by displacement-hardships the legislature found are
"particularly severe for vulnerable seniors, the disabled, the frail,
minorities, large families and single parents."35 The statute provides:
Such personal hardship includes, but is not limited to: economic
loss, time loss, physical and emotional stress, and in some cases
severe emotional trauma, illness, homelessness, or other irreparable
harm resulting from strain of eviction controversy; relocation search
and moving difficulties; anxiety caused by lack of information,
uncertainty, and resultant planning difficulty; employment,
education, family and social disruption; relocation and empty unit
security hazards; relocation to premises of less affordability,
capacity, accessibility and physical or environmental quality; and
relocation adjustment problems, particularly of the blind or other
disabled citizens.36
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, holding that expiration of a lease
did not constitute good cause for eviction, noted that evictions for no fault
of the tenant
create substantial hardships for tenants. At worst, tenants may
become homeless as a result. Even when another residence is
procured, the tenant must bear the expenses and inconveniences of
moving. Relationships with friends and neighbors may be disrupted,
children may be forced into new school districts, and local services
37
and support systems for elderly and disabled tenants may be lost.
Forced displacement causes problems not only for the individuals
affected, but also for society, which has many important, well-recognized
interests in housing-such as in assuring that housing is maintained in
decent condition and administered without discrimination and that
34. See generally Ballard, supra note 25, at 291-92 (discussing the protections of the home
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment). See also State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 159 (Conn.
1991) (holding invalid a search of items left by a homeless person on public land in "a secluded
area that the police knew he regarded as his home").
35. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.la(d) (West 2000) (containing legislative findings and

intent).
36. § 2A:18-61.la(e) (containing legislative findings and intent).
37. Aimco Props., L.L.C. v. Dziewisz, 883 A.2d 310, 313 (N.H. 2005).
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relationships between landlords and tenants are civil, predictable, stable,
and fair. As Justice Holmes wrote for the Supreme Court in 1921,
"Housing is a necessary of life. All the elements of a public interest
justifying some degree of public control are present."3 8 These societal
interests cannot be protected if a tenant does not have security of tenure:
power to evict, the attempt
"If the tenant remained subject to the landlord's
39
to limit the landlord's demands would fail."
Stability of tenure is important to society, which suffers when
children's school performance and the school environment are degraded
because of forced displacement. When low-income elderly or disabled
people, children, or others, suffer physical or mental injury because of
forced displacement, society bears heavy financial and other costs. Society
pays a high price for family disruption, homelessness, and foster care
placement. As the New Jersey legislature found, "[i]t is in the public
interest of the State ...to avoid ...displacement and resultant loss of
affordable housing ...."'0 In enacting the Tenant Protection Act of 1992,
the New Jersey legislature found
that the provision and maintenance of an adequate supply of housing
affordable to persons of low and moderate income in this State has
been and is becoming increasingly difficult as a result of economic
and market forces which require special public actions or subsidies
to counteract. One particularly acute result of this has been the
continual increase in the number of displaced or homeless persons
....
[I]t is necessary to protect residential tenants, particularly those

38. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921).
39. Id. at 157-58 (1921); see also Ball, supra note 3, at 44 (" '[Tihe occupier's lack of
security may make it hard to enforce the landlord's contractual obligations.' This is inherent in
tenancies terminable on short notice, because the security of the tenant is dependent on the
goodwill of the landlord or on good practice, unenforceable by the tenant.").
40. § 2A:18-61.1a(d) (containing legislative findings and intent); see also A.P. Dev. Corp. v.
Band, 550 A.2d 1220, 1224 (N.J. 1988) (stating that "[t]he Act ...flowed from a recognition of
the severe housing shortage in the state" and quoting the statement attached to the Act when it
was proposed: "At present, there are no limitations imposed by statute upon the reasons a
landlord may utilize to evict a tenant.... This is a serious matter, particularly now that there is a
critical shortage of rental housing space in New Jersey."); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson,
638 A.2d 1301, 1309 (N.J. 1994) ("In passing the Act the Legislature was responding to 'a
critical shortage of rental housing space in New Jersey,' . . . a situation that has not abated.");
Montgomery Gateway E. I v. Herrera, 618 A.2d 865, 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("The
Anti-Eviction Act protect[s] residential tenants from the effects of what has become a critical
housing shortage."). In 1988, the court took "judicial notice that the housing shortage remains
severe in New Jersey." A.P. Dev. Corp., 550 A.2d at 1224; see also id. at 1228 ("[G]iven the
acute housing shortage in this state, the total effect of forfeiture on the tenant can be comparable
in severity to the effect of forfeiture on a purchaser of land."); id. at 1231 ("[Tlhe Legislature
intended the Act to be remedial and to be liberally construed, particularly in view of the
continuing critical shortage of affordable housing in this state.").
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of advanced age or disability, or lower economic status, from the
effects of eviction from affordable housing in recognition of the high
costs, both financial and social, to the public of displacement from
affordable housing and of homelessness. 4
Thus, society at large shares with individual tenants an interest in the
ability of tenants to continue to reside in their homes-not forever, under
any circumstances, but until and unless the landlord can make a showing of
good cause for terminating the tenancy. The law long ago recognized that
tenants and society have an interest in not allowing landlords to effectuate
immediate, self-help evictions-requiring some prior notice and, usually,
use of judicial process.42 No matter what the lease may say, these
restrictions on the landlord's power are imposed by the law. Similarly, the
law does not allow a landlord an absolute right to terminate a tenancy if the
termination would frustrate the public interest in assuring the quality of
housing or protecting against many forms of discrimination or retaliation.
In the same way, the law today should recognize that tenants and society
have an interest in protecting the ability of tenants to remain in their homes,
unless and until the landlord can show a good reason for evicting them.
This security should apply not only to tenants who can negotiate long-term
leases, but also to tenants whose lack of market power means that they can
secure only periodic or short-term leases and cannot bargain for protections
of security of tenure or anything else: '"The tenant has 'no more choice in
fixing [these] . . . terms than he has about the weather.'
"43

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTION FOR SECURITY OF TENURE

In light of the importance of security of tenure-to individuals and to
society-it is not surprising that both courts and legislatures have
developed significant protections against arbitrary terminations of
tenancies. In the mid-twentieth century, the United States experienced a
substantial transformation-sometimes called a "revolution"-of landlordtenant law, increasing the legal rights of tenants (and applicants for
41. § 2A:18-61.41 (containing legislative findings and declarations supporting legislation
protecting elderly, disabled, and low-income tenants from conversion to condominium or
cooperative use).
42. See Ballard, supra note 25, at 289-90; see also Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation
of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 507 (1982) (noting that "even in the
eighteenth century, courts were hesitant to subject a tenant to immediate dispossession unless it
was clear that both parties had agreed to such an arrangement" and that, in the nineteenth century,
"[l]ike the courts in Blackstone's day, state legislatures were concerned about the effects an
abrupt termination could have upon a tenant").
43. Robert S. Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: ProposalforChange, 54 GEO.
L.J. 519, 554 (1966) (quoting Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 204 (2d Cir.
1955) (Frank, J.,
dissenting)).
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tenancies) and restricting landlords' control over the relationship." To a
large extent, the changes were accomplished first by judicial action and
then by legislation,45 and represented the application to the landlord-tenant
relationship of both contract principles and public policy considerations.46 47
The "revolution" affected several aspects of landlord-tenant law.
While much scholarly attention has focused on the development of the
"implied warranty of habitability," another area of substantial change
44. Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 519 (1984) ("[Tlhe residential tenant, long the stepchild
of the law, has now become its ward and darling. Tenants' rights have increased dramatically;
landlords' rights have decreased dramatically."). For different views of the changes, from among
much commentary, see generally Glendon, supra note 42; and Roger A. Cunningham, The New
Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitabilityin Residential Leases: From Contractto Status,
16 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979).
45. See Gerald Korngold, Whatever Happened to Landlord-Tenant Law?, 77 NEB. L. REV.
703, 706 (1998) ("After the initial pathbreaking judicial decisions, legislatures began supplanting
courts as the key reform agents in the field."); cf Cunningham, supra note 44, at 6 ("In a majority
of ... jurisdictions, the principle [of the implied warranty of habitability] resulted entirely from
legislative action."); id. at 74-76 (discussing "the modem era of judicial activism in the
expansion of tenants' ights").
46. See Komgold, supra note 45, at 705 (The "notion of the lease as a contract formed the
basis for many of the courts' key decisions .... The legacy of this reform is still seen in current
decisions applying contract principles to leases, yielding different results than under traditional
property rules."). Public policy considerations were applied both independently and as part of
contract doctrine. See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 737, 738-39, 742-43 (2000) ("The external criticism [of classical contract law] situated the
rules in the world of actual contracting practice, arguing that the law's approach needed to be
changed to serve the objectives of contract law. Neoclassical contract law-the law of the
Uniform Commercial Code, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and today-is the product of
this criticism.... Contract is still fundamentally about achieving one's own ends, but those ends
are understood largely in terms of the context out of which they arise. In some cases, moreover,
these ends may be subordinated to external social policies."). But see Glendon, supra note 42, at
504-O5 (stating that "landlord-tenant case law was already deeply pervaded by contract notions
by the end of the nineteenth century" and that what was "new, if not revolutionary," in the midtwentieth century was "that residential and commercial landlord-tenant law have gradually
diverged, the former more influenced by developments in consumer law" and subjected to
"pervasive, mostly statutory, regulation").
47. Other changes in landlord-tenant law included the imposition on landlords of tort
liability for injuries to tenants even when caused by third parties, see Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave.
Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943,
949-50 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (N.H. 1973), general adoption of
the contract principle of dependency of covenants, and imposition on the landlord of a duty to
mitigate damages, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 821-22 (2001); see also Rabin, supra note 44, at 521-40 (discussing
"limitations on landlord's common law right to offer substandard units," limitations on the
"landlord's common law right to set the offering price of a rental unit (rent control)," "expansion
of landlord's tort liability," "limitations on landlord's common law right to choose or reject new
tenants" (including assignees and subtenants), "limitations on landlord's common law right to
evict tenant at termination of lease," "limitations on landlord's common law remedies following
tenant breach," regulations regarding security deposits, and establishment of a landlord duty to
place tenants in actual, as opposed to merely legal, possession).
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involved security of tenure-the landlord's ability to terminate tenancies,
including the right to refuse to renew a tenancy.48 Security of tenure is the
focus of this discussion.
At common law, the general rule was that, absent restrictions in the
lease, the tenant could be evicted for "any reason or no reason at all." 49 At
the end of the period of a periodic tenancy or the term of a tenancy for a
term, absent some provision in the lease, the landlord was under no
obligation whatever to renew the tenancy.5" The tenant's only entitlement
was to durationally appropriate notice of the termination.5
Restrictions on the landlord's ability to terminate a tenancy "for any
reason or no reason at all" developed with respect to tenants in both
subsidized and unsubsidized housing. The protections for tenants in
subsidized housing began with tenants in government-owned public
housing and then were extended to tenants in privately-owned housing
where government subsidies were provided either to the tenant or to the
landlord.52 For tenants participating in government housing programs, the
courts and then Congress imposed both procedural and substantive
protections from dispossession. 3 The procedural protections assured
tenants notice and an opportunity for a hearing with regard to proposed
dispossession; the substantive protection was a requirement that the
government agency or landlord prove good cause for dispossession. 4

48. See Rabin, supra note 44, at 533-37.
49. Glendon, supra note 42, at 539-40. "Lease" is used in this Article to mean any rental
agreement, written or oral.
50. Id. at 539-40; accord Bell, supra note 8, at 491-92 (noting that, at common law, "[tihe
landlord had no obligation to renew the lease or to notify the tenant of the expiration prior to
filing eviction proceedings).
51. Bell, supra note 8, at 492.
52. See Carter v. Md. Mgmt. Co., 835 A.2d 158, 164 (Md. 2003) (holding that good cause
for eviction is required in Low Income Housing Tax Credit developments); NATIONAL HOUSING
LAW PROJECT, HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS: TENANTS' RIGHTS § 14/2 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter
HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS] (discussing this evolution); NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT,
RHCDS (FMHA) HOUSING PROGRAMS: TENANTS' AND PURCHASERS' RIGHTS ch. 14 (2d ed.
1995) [hereinafter RHCDS (FMHA) HOUSING PROGRAMS] (discussing the requirements for
housing programs of the U.S. Department of Agriculture).
53. See HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 52, §§ 14/1-14/6; RHCDS (FMHA)
HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 52, ch. 14; Bell, supra note 8, at 500-01; Glendon, supra note
42, at 542-43; Shelby D. Green, The Public Housing Tenancy: Variations on the Common Law
that Give Security of Tenure and Control, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 681, 719-30 (1994) (describing
the evolution of these principles).
54. The underpinning of the good cause requirement in government-sponsored housing
programs is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; the obligation has
been codified for many assisted housing programs, even where the landlord is a private entity
rather than a government agency. See HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 52, §§ 14/6-14/14;
see also 2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 16B.05 [2] & nn. 47-48 (2007)
(discussing the circumstances in which there exists a good-cause requirement for eviction).
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For tenants in "private" housing not directly benefitting from
government subsidies, protections from dispossession developed more
slowly." Courts and then legislatures established a list of limitations on the
landlord's right to terminate tenancies or take other actions
disadvantageous to tenants: landlords were forbidden to retaliate against
tenants for reporting housing code violations to enforcement officials, for
complaining about bad housing conditions,56 or for seeking to use tenant

remedies.57 In at least one jurisdiction, courts protected tenants from
termination for refusing to commit perjury in a civil action against the
landlord and for reporting the landlord's sexual molestation of the tenant's
daughter. 8

Landlords also were forbidden to dispossess or otherwise

disadvantage tenants because of race, color, national origin, religion, sex,
disability, or the presence of children in the household. 9 In some
jurisdictions, landlords also were forbidden to discriminate on the bases of

marital status, sexual orientation, source of income, or other
characteristics.6 ° In some jurisdictions, tenants were given some protection
Privately-owned developments subsidized under the Section 8 program, and private owners who
have tenants who have Section 8 certificates or vouchers, originally were required not to
terminate the tenancies without good cause. Since 1996, however, Congress has required good
cause for eviction in the Section 8 program only during the term of the lease. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(d)(l)(B)(ii) (2000). Good cause for eviction is required in the subsidized housing
programs of the Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing and Community Development
Service. See 7 C.F.R. § 3560.159 (2007); RHCDS (FMHA) HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 52,
ch. 14. Similarly, in the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program, created in 1986, owners are
required to show good cause in order to terminate tenancies and to fail to renew. See Carter,835
A.2d at 165; California Tax Credit Committee Notifies Owners of Requirement for Good Cause
To Terminate Tenancy, HOUS. & DEV. REP. (West), May 9, 2005, at 300 (reporting that the
California Tax Credit Allocation Committee had notified project owners that Rev. Rul. 2004-82,
2004-2 C.B. 350, "requires all tax credit regulatory agreements to include a prohibition against
eviction or termination of a tenancy without good cause for the duration of the extended use
period, as well as for the following three years" and that " '[t]his prohibition includes any nonrenewal of a lease or rental agreement' ").
55. I put "private" into quotation marks and distinguish between obvious and subtle
government subsidies because virtually all apparently "private" housing benefits from
government subsidies.
This is perhaps most important with respect to single-family
homeownership, which benefits from multiple government subsidies, including, but not limited
to, the deductibility of payments for real estate taxes and mortgage interest. See Peter Dreier,
Federal Housing Subsidies: Who Benefits and Why?, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING: FOUNDATION
FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 105, 107-10 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 2006).
56. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1016
(1969).
57. Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 862-63 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
58. See Bell, supra note 8, at 498 nn.78-80 (citing cases so holding).
59. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 804-06, 82 Stat. 81, 83-84 (1968) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06 (2000)).
60. See, e.g., Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities v. Sullivan Assoc., 739 A.2d
238, 253-54 (Conn. 1999) (source of income); Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235
(Mass. 1994) (marital status); Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1112 (N.J.
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from dispossession by conversion to condominiums, cooperatives, or other
uses, 6 1 or by sale of the property; these protections take the form of
entitlement to remain as a renter or a right to renew the tenancy or purchase
the property.62
As scholars reviewed the changes in the 1960s and 1970s, they
expected further common law development of security of tenure for tenants
in private, as well as subsidized, housing. Specifically, what they
anticipated was the recognition of a requirement of either good faith or
good cause for termination. Professor Glendon, for example, foresaw "the
habitability issue ...

yielding center stage" to other developments,

including "security of tenure for the tenant, and the qualification of the
landlord's traditional rights to alienate the freehold or to convert it to
another use.

63

Professor Margaret Radin wrote in 1982 that if a leasehold

were a personal residence, the law should grant tenure during good
behavior, regardless of the lease term.64 Professor Deborah Hodges Bell
wrote a 1985 article proposing "that the courts directly recognize a tenant's
expectation of security by imposing on landlords a duty to terminate [only]
in good faith."65 Powell on Real Property states that a right to good-causeeviction-only not rooted in constitutional or specific statutory provisions
could be based either on public policy or as implied in fact from the
parties' continual renewal of a lease, and discusses also the analogous
development of a good cause requirement for termination of franchise
agreements.6 6
Despite the expectations of these and other academicians,67 only a
very few jurisdictions limited residential terminations to those for which

1999) (source of income); Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099, 1102 (N.Y. 2001) (sexual
orientation); see also Rabin, supra note 44, at 531-32 (discussing California's Unruh Act, which
has been said to bar discrimination based on such characteristics as student enrollment,
"occupation, political affiliation, or age").
61. See 2 POWELL, supra note 54, § 16B.05[3]; Bell, supra note 8, at 493-94, 494 n.55;
Glendon, supra note 42, at 553; Rabin, supra note 44, at 535-37, 556-58, 582. The New Jersey
Tenant Protection Act of 1992 protects from conversion to condominium or cooperative use
tenants who are "of advanced age or disability, or lower economic status." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A: 18-61.41 (West 2000) (legislative findings and declarations).
62. 2 POWELL, supra note 54, § 16B.05.
63. Glendon, supra note 42, at 505.
64. Radin, supra note 22, at 994.
65. Bell, supra note 8, at 484.; see also McFadden, supra note 26, at 39-40 (arguing that a
"right to stay makes itself manifest" in a variety of legal areas, "[l]ike the 'right of privacy' a
century ago"); Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1097, 1113-14 (1981).
66. 2 POWELL, supra note 54, § 16B.05[2].
67. See, e.g., Green, supra note 53, at 714 (writing, in 1994, that "[e]stablishing a right to
continued possession beyond the lease term and abandoning the termination or nonrenewal
without cause rule may be the next logical step in the 'lease as a contract' paradigm.").
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the landlord could establish good cause, and the few jurisdictions that did
The Uniform
so used legislation, not litigation, for that purpose.
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act ("URLTA") "require[d] both parties to
the lease to engage in good faith in the performance of lease agreements
and duties, an obligation that is broad enough to include the requirement of
good cause to evict."). 68 Good cause for termination was required in
jurisdictions that had rent control legislation.69 Some legislatures required
good cause to terminate the tenancies of some owners (and sometimes
A good-cause-for-termination
renters) of manufactured housing.70
requirement protects elderly and disabled tenants in Connecticut. 7' New
Hampshire requires good cause for eviction in much, but not all, rental
housing.7 2 In New Jersey and the District of Columbia, as well as Seattle,

68. Unif. Residential Landlord and Tenant Act § 1.302, 7B U.L.A. 427-508 (1985 & Supp.
1998) ("Every duty under this Act and every act which must be performed as a condition
precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under this Act imposes an obligation of good faith
in its performance or enforcement."); see 2 POWELL, supra note 54, § 16B.05[2] ("The Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act does not, by its terms, require the landlord to have good
cause to evict. However, URLTA does require both parties to the lease to engage in good faith in
the performance of lease agreements and duties, an obligation that is broad enough to include the
requirement of good cause to evict."). But see Sullivan, supra note 14, at 1046 ("Under common
law, no court has applied the Act's good faith provisions to termination or nonrenewal of
tenancies.").
69. See Glendon, supra note 42, at 543; Michael D. Bergman, Property Law: Recent
Developments in Rent Control and Related Laws Regulating the Landlord-Tenant Relationship,
1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 691, 693 (1991) (stating some rent control laws "give the tenant a
'statutory tenancy' whereby the tenant is protected from lease termination except for cause or for
enumerated statutory exceptions").
70. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 62 (stating that eleven states now "limit a
community operator's right to evict for noncompliance with rules"); see also Sullivan, supra note
14, at 1057-59 (discussing the judicial extension to renters of mobile homes of the good-causefor-termination requirement legislatively provided to owners of mobile homes).
71. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-23c (2004) ("Prohibition [of] eviction of certain tenants except
for good cause"); see 2 POWELL, supra note 54, § 16B.05[2], n.49; see also Sullivan, supra note
14, at 1056-57 (discussing the Connecticut legislation).
72. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:2 (2006) requires good cause for eviction by landlords who
rent restricted property: "[L]andlords who are generally in the business of renting residential
property, and whose main concern is, presumably, profit." Aimco Properties, L.L.C. v. Dziewisz,
883 A.2d 310, 313 (N.H. 2005). This requirement does not apply to
single-family houses if the owner of such a house does not own more than three singlefamily houses at one time, rental units in an owner-occupied building containing a total
of four units or fewer, rental units in a vacation or recreational dwelling rented during the
off-season for certain purposes, or single-family houses acquired by banks or other
mortgagees through foreclosure.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Sullivan, supra note 14, at 1055-56 (discussing the New
Hampshire legislation).
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Oakland, San Francisco, and other cities, good cause for termination is
required for all tenants.73
While some legislatures have imposed a good-cause-for-termination
requirement, judicial creation of the doctrine has been essentially nonexistent. As Powell on Real Property states, "the argument for a good
cause requirement for the termination or nonrenewal of tenancies has been
accepted more by the commentary than the cases."74 It is important to note,
however, that the problem is not that the courts have been rejecting a
requirement of good cause for termination; rather, the problem is that
litigants have not been asking courts to impose that requirement as a matter
of common law.75
Thus, in general, at common law, a landlord is free to terminate a
tenancy so long as he honors the lease, gives proper notice, and cannot be
shown to have a specifically forbidden motivation; in general, the wellbehaved, respectful, law- and lease-abiding tenant can be evicted (with
proper notice) no matter how long she has lived in the premises, how much
she has improved the premises, or how attached she is to her home.76
Tenancies can be terminated without regard to the impact on stability of
school attendance, medical treatment, employment or religious
requirements, or disruption of family relationships.

73. Anti-Eviction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.1 to 18-61.12 (West 2000); Tenant
Protection Act of 1992, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.40 to 18-61.59 (West 2000); Senior Citizens
and Disabled Protected Tenancy Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.30 (West 2000); D.C. Rental
Housing Act of 1985, D.C. CODE §§ 42-3505.01 to 3505.08 (2001); Housing and Building
Maintenance Code, SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 22.206.160(c) (effective March 24, 2003); Just
Cause for Eviction Ordinance, OAKLAND, CAL., CODE § 8.22.300 to 8.22.390 (2003); Residential
Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance, SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE,
§ 37.9; Just Cause and Retaliatory Evictions, GLENDALE, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 9.30.010 to
9.30.100 (2004); see 2 POWELL, supra note 54, § 16B.0512] & n.49; Glendon, supra note 42, at
543,554.
74. 2 POWELL, supra note 54, § 16B.05[2]. But see Bell, supra note 8, at 507-08 (assuming
that "imposition of a good cause requirement" would "requir[e] ...legislative action").
75. I base this statement on the facts that (a) I have been unable to find reported decisions of
such cases or articles referencing such decisions and (b) on June 5, 2007, I asked members of the
National Housing Law Project's Housing Justice Network listserv if any of them had litigated or
knew of any litigation concerning a good-cause-for-eviction requirement in private, unsubsidized
housing (other than under statutes like those in New Jersey and Connecticut). The responses,
from vastly experienced and sophisticated tenant advocates, were negative. See E-mail from
Kenneth Goldman, Senior Attorney, South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., to Housing Justice
Network (June 16, 2005, 14:51 PST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
76. See Ishbel Dickens, American Dream or Nightmare?: Identifying and Meeting the
Needs of Owners of ManufacturedHomes, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 637, 637 (2007) (discussing
the problems of the owners of manufactured homes that are placed on leased property: "These
tenants may have paid their rent on time, followed community rules, invested in their home's
infrastructure, and have otherwise been model citizens in their communities. Yet they have little,
if any, protection if the landlord chooses to sell the land beneath their homes.").
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There is no reason for this situation to continue; as the academicians
set out more than twenty years ago, common law doctrines provide ample
basis for imposing a good-cause-for-termination requirement on those who
rent homes and those who rent land on which owners of manufactured
homes places their houses. Part III considers why these doctrines have not
been advanced in the courts; Part TV discusses the common law doctrines
that support a good-cause-for-termination requirement.
III. GOOD CAUSE FOR TERMINATION: LEGISLATIVE VS. COMMON LAW
DEVELOPMENT

Advocates for low-income renters (of homes and land) have
successfully asked courts to slice deeply into landowner prerogatives.
Among many other things, in most situations, the occupant now can
compel a landowner to put and maintain property in standard condition and
can prevent termination by a showing that the landowner's reason for
displacement violates some important public policy.77 Covenants in a lease
generally are considered dependent.7 8 Landlords are required to mitigate
damages when tenants abandon the property.79 Landlords are subject to
strict regulation of their use of security deposits.8" Although some of this
was achieved by legislation, most of it is rooted in judicial development of
the common law, working radical changes in the nature of the estate
concept that used to govern real estate rental relationships.8 1 These
advocates also have persuaded the courts to make exceptions to the
landowner's ability to terminate a tenancy "for any reason or no reason at
all,"82 but have stopped short of asking the courts to reverse the general rule
and establish instead the general principle that a tenancy may continue
unless the landowner can show good cause for termination. Why this
reluctance?
The reluctance is not due to some sense that the good-cause-fortermination requirement is itself inappropriate. To the contrary, advocates
have been assiduous in advancing the good-cause-for-termination principle
in legislation-in federal subsidy programs, for manufactured housing
owners, for some or all renters, as in Connecticut, New Hampshire, New

77. See Rabin, supra note 44, at 521-27 (regarding conditions); id. at 533-38 (regarding

termination).
78. Id. at 524.
79. Id. at 539.

80. Id. at 539-40.
81. See Korngold, supra note 45, at 703. For a discussion of the advocacy underlying one
case, see generally Richard H. Chused, Saunders (a.k.a. Javins) v. First National Realty
Corporation, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 191 (2004).
82. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
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Jersey, the District of Columbia, Seattle, and elsewhere.8 3 But the
advocates have not advanced this principle in the courts. In this area of
landlord-tenant law, at least, legislatures have replaced the courts as the
institutions to which advocates look for reform.
This preference for legislative action seems to be rooted in a sense that
imposition of a good-cause-for-termination requirement is a more dramatic
infringement of landowner rights than were other elements of the landlordtenant "transformation" and that legislation therefore is a more appropriate
way of making changes in this regard.' Careful analysis shows, however,
that good cause for termination is not a more dramatic infringement of
landowner rights than other tenant victories have been, and that common
law development in this area may be superior to legislative development
and is necessary to enable the common law courts to perform their basic
function of pursing justice.
Advocates today may see as commonplace such doctrines as the
implied warranty of habitability, retaliatory eviction, and prohibitions
against racial and other forms of discrimination in housing, but in their day,
each of these doctrines was at least as controversial as good cause for
eviction is today.85 As Judge Albie Sachs wrote about the end of apartheid

83. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
84. Professor Korngold says that "landlord-tenant law no longer occupies the center stage in
real property law" that it held in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Korngold, supra note 45, at 704
("[W]e have not seen cases declaring paradigmatic shifts .... [T]he new Restatement of
Property has moved on to other areas ....[and] the number of law review articles on the subject
of landlord-tenant published during the period of 1991-1997 was only one-half the number
published during 1967-1973"). While this may indicate a lack of academic interest, tenant
advocates have continued to work aggressively, both on behalf of individual tenants and to secure
change in the law. For the latter effort, however, the advocates have focused more on legislative
change than on change through the courts. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
There might also be concern about the conservatism of courts, but (a) many courts were
conservative in the days of the landlord-tenant transformation, and (b) many legislatures today are
conservative. See Brian Gilmore, Love You Madly: The Life and Times of the Neighborhood
Legal Services Program of Washington, D.C., 10 D.C. L. REV. 69, 86 (2007) (stating that the
efforts of the D.C. Neighborhood Legal Services Program "were so dramatic in the city's Court
of General Sessions that the judges on the Court accused the program's lawyers of abuse and
delaying tactics"); id. at 92 (quoting this author as describing the D.C. Court of Appeals as
'very conservative' at that time").
85. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 44, at 140-43 (discussing criticism of the doctrine of
implied warranty of habitability); Charles Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the
American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. REV. 879, 879 (1975) (criticizing the doctrine). All of these
changes seem very dramatic until they happen, and then they become part of the accepted mores
of society. See Chused, supra note 81, at 200-06 (discussing the difficulties of establishing some
of these principles); Gilmore, supra note 84, at 106 (describing the adoption of formerly
controversial doctrines).
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in South Africa: "All revolutions are impossible until they happen, then
they become inevitable. 86
A good-cause-for-eviction requirement may seem offensive because it
involves the continued presence of the tenant on the property over the
objection of the landlord, thus apparently imposing a physical intrusion
onto the landlord's property with the continued, unwelcome occupancy by
the tenant.87 This vision draws on a visceral, atavistic commitment to
"property rights" and an aversion to physical intrusions, evidenced perhaps
most obviously in the Loretto doctrine of per se taking for even a minor
physical intrusion.88

86. ALBIE SACHS, RUNNING TO MAPUTO 173 (1990).
87. See, e.g., Laura L. Westray, Note, Are Landlords Being Taken by the Good Cause
Eviction Requirement?, 62 S.CAL. L. REv. 321, 323 (1988) (arguing that the good-cause-foreviction requirement of Santa Monica's rent control ordinance "effectuate[si a taking by
authorizing a permanent, physical occupation at the tenant's will"); see also Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 526 (1992) (arguing that limitations on rent increases and evictions
assured tenants of "permanent physical occupation" of the landowner's land, thus amounting to a
taking without just compensation); Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apts., 136 F.3d 293, 300
(2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the so-called "endless lease," the caricature used to eviscerate the
good-cause-for-termination requirement in the Section 8 existing housing program. Landlords
complained, successfully, that requiring good cause for termination was the equivalent of giving
the tenant an "endless lease"). Careful analysis will show, however, that by definition the lease
and the tenancy are not endless or permanent, but may be terminated; the only requirement is that
there be good cause for the termination-thus making the definition of good cause the crucial
issue. See Aimco Properties, L.L.C. v. Dziewisa, 883 A.2d 310, 314 (N.H. 2005) (stating that, in
a good cause regime, "[a] landlord, of course, is not forced into a perpetual landlord-tenant
relationship, and may terminate the tenancy for good cause").
88. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); see also
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921) (Justice Holmes wrote for the Court, "The fact that
tangible property is also visible tends to give rigidity to our conception of our rights in it that we
do not attach to others less concretely clothed."); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Correctly Interpreting
Long-Term Leases Pursuant to Modern Contract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases,
74 VA. L. REv. 751, 751 (1988) (referring to "land-real property-which has mystical
connotations in our legal system."). For an example of such a property-rights-oriented approach,
see Manufactured Hous. Communities of Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 187 (Wash. 2000) (and
note the concurring judge's citation to the CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 106TH CONGRESS (Edward H. Crane & David Boaz eds., 1999)).
See also Bergman, supra note 69, at 713-14 (criticizing the use of permanent physical occupation
analysis for rent control and land use regulation). Professor Bergman states that
[r]egulatory analysis provides a more appropriate framework for scrutinizing rent control
ordinances because it considers the public interest inherent in the landlord-tenant
relationship. The Supreme Court has rejected the application of the narrowly applied
permanent physical occupation theory of Loretto in the rent control context. Physical
occupation requires an actual appropriation of the property, whereas the housing
ordinances in question are economic regulations which do not constitute an actual
physical invasion.
Bergman, supra note 69, at 713-14.
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But neither "property rights" nor "physical intrusion" justifies
allowing terminations of tenancies without good cause. Both the landlord
and the tenant have property interests. The issue is not whether to protect
property interests, but rather how to accommodate the competing property
interests of the landlord and the tenant. 89 The Supreme Court already has

recognized that a tenant has a property interest in the expectation that a
lease will be renewed.'

Moreover, it is not more intrusive to restrain the

landowner's ability to terminate a tenancy than to control the landowner's
maintenance of the property during the tenancy or the landlord's ability to
reject a subtenant or assignee.9
And the common law already has

established that there are circumstances in which a tenant may remain on
the property over the objection of the landlord.9" The issue raised here is
not whether there are situations in which a tenant may remain on the
property over the objections of the landlord, but rather what are those

situations.
The debate about what should be done by legislation and what should
be done by common law development is perdurable. In every instance of
reform, some have argued that changes should be made by legislation
rather than the courts.93 And there are, to be sure, some advantages to

using legislation rather than judicial action.94
There also are, however, some advantages to using common law
development, and those advantages are particularly salient with respect to
89. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (recognizing
a tenant's property interest in the tenancy). This may seem an obvious statement, but it is not:
courts, including the Supreme Court, often refer to the leased premises as "the landlord's
property," ignoring the fact that the tenant also has a property interest. See, e.g., Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72 (1972) ("The tenant is, by definition, in possession of the property of the
landlord .... ). In fact, the litigation's purpose is to determine whether the possessory interest is
the landlord's or the tenant's. See Green, supra note 53, at 716-18 (discussing the recognition of
a right to continued possession as an aspect of the tenant's property interest).
90. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473 (1973)
(holding that, in condemnation case, possibility of lease renewal is to be taken into account in
determining value of the leasehold).
91. See Green, supra note 53, at 713 ("It is difficult ... to see how the consequences of the
intrusion would differ significantly from the effects of the rejection of the no-repair rule.").
92. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1969) (showing that retaliatory eviction is one example of a situation in which a tenant may
stay despite a landlord's objection).
93. See, e.g., id. at 704 (Danaher, J., dissenting) (establishing the doctrine of retaliatory
eviction). Judge Danaher argued that any protection from retaliation should be provided by the
legislature, not by the courts. Id.
94. See, e.g., Korngold, supra note 45, at 706 ("Law reform by legislation rather than
judicial decision offers certain advantages. Legislatures can engage in fact finding, fully consider
an issue, and determine public policy and priorities as well as craft comprehensive solutions. In
contrast, courts can only decide issues before them. Moreover, principles of separation of powers
arguably require that legislatures make policy choices." (citations omitted)).
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requiring just cause for eviction. The common law's focus on the
particular facts of particular cases is especially important here, for
development in this area requires making many distinctions and balancing
competing interests. The result in any particular case will vary depending
upon many factors, including: whether the tenancy is commercial or
residential; whether the residential property is a single-family or multifamily home; whether the landowner lives on the property; whether the
landowner is a large or small participant in the rental housing business;
how long the tenant has lived at that location; how much of a financial
investment the tenant has made in the property; what representations the
landowner may have made about continued occupancy; how many times
and for what length of time the tenancy may have been renewed in the past;
how important continued residence may be for educational, health,
religious, employment, psychological, or other reasons; and how "tight" the
local housing market may be and how difficult and how expensive it may
be, for any reason, for the tenant to secure replacement housing. It is the
case-by-case development of the common law that best accommodates the
explication of standards to resolve such conflicts.95
Finally, common law growth in this area is essential to vindicate the
integrity of the common law itself. As Justice Cardozo wrote, "the judge is
under a duty, within the limits of his power of innovation, to maintain a
relation between law and morals, between the precepts of jurisprudence and
those of reason and good conscience."" The elaboration of such judicial
creations as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and other
doctrines we will be discussing in Part IV is essential to vindicate "a
commitment to the most fundamental objectives a legal system can havejustice, and justice according to law."97
IV. COMMON LAW DOCTRINES TO PROTECT SECURITY OF TENURE

As this Part will show, well-established common law doctrines are
available to protect tenant security of tenure at varying levels of generality.
95. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 64-65 (1924) (indicating the
need for common law development to avoid "harsh or bizarre conclusions, at war with social
needs"); ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 51 (1954) (noting the
legislature "cannot make laws so complete and all embracing that the judicial organ will not be
obliged to exercise a certain law-making function also"); id. at 54-56 (discussing the importance
of judicial discretion); id. at 69 ("Where legislation is ineffective, the same difficulties that
prevent its satisfactory operation require us to leave a wide margin of discretion in application.");
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 194 (1996) ("[C]ase-by-case
particularism has advantages over the creation of and application of broad rules.").
96.

BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 133-34 (1921).

97. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and
Conceptualization,67 CORNELL L. REv, 810, 811,826 (1982).

2008]

RIGHT TO REMAIN

In certain kinds of situations, particular tenants' interests in security of
tenure should be protected by such principles as unconscionability,
estoppel, and adhesion98 or by implied-in-fact requirements of good faith
In
and fair dealing, reasonableness, or good cause for termination.9
as
the
factors
account
such
take
into
would
courts
such
doctrines,
applying
length of time the tenant had occupied the premises, the number of times
the tenancy had been renewed in the past,'0° investments the tenant may

98. As to unconscionability, see M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability,78 YALE
L.J. 757, 808-12 (1968); and Audrey Goldstein Fleissig, Note, Unconscionability: A New
Helping Hand to Residential Tenants, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 993, 993-94. For a discussion of the
use of unconscionability doctrine with respect to termination of franchise agreements and, by
analogy, to leases, see Bell, supra note 8, at 536 ("[Ihe doctrine is inappropriate unless courts
are to hold that, because of the inherent inequality of bargaining power between landlord and
tenant, an express or implied power to terminate a tenancy for any reason is unconscionable.").
See also id. at 508, 521 n.182, 523, 527 n.214; Edward Chase & E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Landlord
and Tenant: A Study in Property and Contract, 30 VILL. L. REV. 571, 680 (1985) (discussing
unconscionability). As to estoppel, see, for example, Chase & Taylor, supra, at 674 n.368
(stating that "where the tenant's reliance upon the assumption that the landlord may not terminate
at will is crucial to the case, flexibility in result is attainable under the pliable promissory estoppel
doctrine formulated in the Second Restatement" of Contracts, § 90). As to adhesion, see
Schoshinski, supra note 43, at 555-56:
All of the elements of adhesion contracts and characteristic circumstances surrounding
their execution exist in the case of a lease by an indigent tenant. Most landlords use a
standardized form of lease or at least standardized language. The landlord is the
draftsman and the terms strongly favor him. The tenant has no choice but to adhere by
signing the lease or to reject the entire transaction and remain homeless. If the courts
have been willing to provide relief in the case of automobile purchases, how much more
willing should they be to provide similar relief for the indigent tenant when the basic
necessity of shelter is at stake?
See also id. at 554 (These are "contracts of adhesion" or "take-it-or-leave it" contracts.); Johnson,
supra note 88, at 807 ("Form leases of limited duration should be ... subject to the normal rules
of contracting, including adhesion and unconscionability. These leases are contracts that may be
susceptible to bargaining imperfections; for example, residential leases and leases of a limited
These
duration (say three years or less) may fall within this category presumptively ....
[bargaining] imperfections may result in formulations that, for policy reasons, such as decreasing
instances of unconscionable behavior, the court may examine and strike.").
99. As to good faith and fair dealing, see Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735, 738-39 (Md.
1990). As to reasonableness, see Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598, 603 (N.J. 1973). As
to good cause for termination, see 2 POWELL, supra note 54, § 16B.05[2] (making the case for an
implied-in-fact warranty of security of tenure absent good cause for termination and stating that
"[i]n an era of severe housing shortages, continuity of possession is not less vital to the tenant
than the quality of possession recognized in the implied warranty of habitability, residential
tenants lack the bargaining power to secure an express good cause termination provisions, and
relevant analogies to the law of sales of goods suggest that such a right exists.").
100. As Powell on Real Property states:
[Iln cases in which the landlord over a period of time has continually maintained or
renewed an existing tenancy, a good cause termination right could be implied in fact
from the parties' course of performance under the lease. The landlord's continuation of
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have made in the property, the landowner's past policy with respect to
continued occupancy, the landlord's purpose in seeking to terminate the
tenancy, the hardship that displacement would cause the tenant, and any
representations the landowner might have made with respect to continued
occupancy. °1 Certainly, this would mean that when a landowner assures a
tenant that a property will not be sold or that the tenancy would not be
terminated, especially when the tenant had made a substantial investment in
the property in reliance upon that representation, the landowner will not be
allowed to renege on those representations. 2 These traditional equitable
doctrines should be useful to advocates representing both owners of
manufactured housing sited in manufactured housing communities and
tenants.
More tenants would be protected by recognition of an implied-in-law
requirement of good faith and fair dealing or an implied-in-law requirement
of good cause for eviction. There are powerful precedents for both. The

the tenancy in such cases creates a legitimate expectation in the tenant that the tenancy
will continue, and the implied good cause term protects that expectation.
Id.; see also Almota Farmers Elev. & Warehouse Co. v. U.S., 409 U.S. 470, 481 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing renewals); Bell, supra note 8, at 516-18 (discussing an
implied-in-fact requirement of good faith). The issue of expectations is very complex. On the
one hand, many tenants do in fact have an expectation that their tenancies will continue. See Bell,
supra note 8, at 539-40 ("In residential leases for a fixed term, the landlord typically renews the
lease for additional periods if the tenant wishes to continue in the tenancy and has complied with
terms of the previous lease. In practice, the relationship is similar to a periodic tenancy in terms
of the expectations of the parties. While the tenancy is explicitly rather than automatically
renewed at the end of the period, the parties nonetheless anticipate a continuing relationship.
Under these circumstances, the tenant's expectation of continuity is as real as the expectation of
continuity in the periodic tenancy, and the injury resulting from a coercive or vindictive [or any
other] refusal to renew the lease is as great."). Landlords, especially in tight housing markets,
probably understand that tenants expect that their tenancies will be renewed. On the other hand,
written leases and legal rules often contradict this expectation by authorizing the landowner to
terminate. In these circumstances, it seems to me difficult to define what are the reasonable or
legitimate expectations of tenants. I have not tried to resolve this difficulty in this Article. See
generally Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does it
Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6 (2002) (discussing these issues in the related context of
employment).
101. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 8, at 517 nn.165 & 167 (discussing employment cases in
which the length of employment was a factor in holdings that an implied covenant of good faith
had been violated).
102. See Dickens, supra note 76, at 644 ("Often, before moving into a community,
prospective purchasers [of manufactured homes] ask the community owner or manager if the
community may be sold in the near future. Reassured that it will not be, they purchase their home
and move into the manufactured-housing community only to receive a twelve-month closing-ofpark notice, sometimes within mere months of moving into the community."). Such doctrines as
fraud in the inducement and promissory estoppel also would be useful in this kind of situation.
See, e.g., Chase & Taylor, supra note 98, at 674 n.368.
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remainder of this Part will discuss each and the factors that would be
relevant in applying either.
A.

The Implied Covenant of Good Faithand FairDealing

An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been
recognized in contract law for decades. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts recognized prior judicial holdings by specifying that "[e]very
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement."' 3 This has been part of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts since 19 7 9 ."°4 It is codified by the Uniform
Commercial Code."0 5 The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions apply it
as a matter of common law. 0 6 The doctrine furthers "the most fundamental
policy objectives of any legal system: " '[b]y invoking good faith ...it
may be possible for a judge to do justice and do it according to law.' "o107
The reasons for the implication of a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing into contracts apply with full and equal force to leases. Indeed, in
some of the seminal articles about the implied covenant, contract scholars
chose to use leases as examples of the application of the implied
covenant'°8:
Since the publication of the Restatement in 1981, a vast number of
courts have come to rely on the implied obligation of good faith as a
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); see Summers, supra note 97, at
810-14 (discussing the background of the Restatement provision).
104. See Summers, supra note 97, at 810 (discussing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts'
duty of good faith and fair dealing, which was adopted by the American Law Institute in 1979
and published in final form in 1981).
105. Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the
Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing Has Been Violated: A Frameworkfor Resolving the
Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585, 585 n. 1 (1996) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes
an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." (citing U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994));
Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) Empty Vessel?,
2005 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 ("The Uniform Commercial Code, adopted by every state except
Louisiana, defines good faith as 'honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing,' and it explicitly imposes a good faith obligation on the performance
and enforcement of every contract falling within its scope." (citing U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(20) and I304 (amended 2003)) (footnote omitted)).
106. Diamond & Foss, supra note 105, 585-86 n.l ("Only Texas has expressly refused to
recognize the covenant's relevance to arms' length contracts and limited its application to cases in
which a special relationship between the parties is found, such as in insurance contracts"
(citations omitted)).
107. Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General ContractLaw and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 198 (1968).
108. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 384-85 (1980); Summers, supra note 97, at 831 (using the
illustration of a lease to resolve a disagreement among contracts scholars).
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sort of " 'safety valve' to which judges may turn to fill gaps and
qualify or limit rights and duties otherwise arising under rules of law
and specific contract language."1
Judges interpreting leases, no less than judges interpreting other contracts,
have need of such a "safety valve."" 0
And courts long have been applying the covenant of good faith and
To take but one example, in Julian v.
fair dealing to leases."'
Christopher,"' the Maryland Court of Appeals said that since 1964, it had
"recognized that in a lease, as well as in other contracts, 'there exists an
implied covenant that each of the parties thereto will act in good faith and
deal fairly with the others.' "I" The court then held that under the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a lease provision requiring landlord
permission for a sublease would be interpreted as requiring the landlord to
act reasonably in deciding whether to grant such permission." 4 It is
generally recognized that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing applies to leases, although virtually all the cases applying the
have involved leases that were commercial
implied covenant to leases
5
1
residential.
than
rather
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contract law
applies to performance and enforcement of the contract, including "abuse
of a power to determine compliance or to terminate the contract.""' 6 The
covenant has been used to protect continued occupancy in a situation very
similar to that of a leasehold-the situation of parties labeled "franchisees"
rather than "tenants." These cases include situations in which the franchise

109. Houh, supra note 105, at 8 (quoting Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good
Faith-ItsRecognition and Conceptualization,67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 812 (1982)).
110. Professor Houh argues that case analysis shows "that, notwithstanding the principles of
justice and fairness that theoretically justify the Restatementlexcluder-analysis approach, good
faith analysis is used consistently to effect economic outcomes and norms and as a proxy and
rhetorical framework for breach of contract analyses." Houh, supra note 105, at 14.
111. Bell, supra note 8, at 534-35 (noting that "[w]hile use of good faith in this particular
manner is a novel concept in landlord-tenant law, the obligation of good faith is well-established
as a basic principle governing lease agreements" and noting also that the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act imposes an obligation of good faith generally).
112. 575 A.2d 735 (Md. 1990).
113. Id. at 793 (quoting Food Fair v. Blumberg, 200 A.2d 166, 174 (Md. 1964)).
114. Id.
115. This is curious because, in general and in this case, the reasons for recognizing implied
requirements apply more strongly to residential than to commercial leases; residential tenants
generally are more in need of judicial assistance than are commercial tenants. See, e.g., Paula C.
Murray, The Evolution of Implied Warranties in Commercial Real Estate Leases, 28 U. RICH. L.
REV. 145, 162-77 (1994) (discussing the reluctance of many courts to apply to commercial leases
the implied warranty of habitability that was developed for residential tenancies).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. (e)(1981).
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contracts expressly permitted termination of the franchise without cause
and at least "two decisions [that] impose upon the franchisor an obligation
of good faith when determining whether to renew a franchise that
automatically expires at the end of a specified period.""' 7 Earlier franchise
law, like landlord-tenant law, allowed non-renewal for any reason or no
reason at all, and earlier "[c]ourts held that the [franchisor's] motive [for
termination] was irrelevant because the franchisor had the legal right to
terminate the franchise under the contract, a result the franchisee could
have avoided by contracting for a protective provision requiring good faith
or good cause for termination."' 18 In these more modem cases, however, "a
number of courts upheld the claims of franchisees who were unilaterally
terminated under contract provisions.
They did so ... primarily by
imposing an obligation of good faith on the franchisor's exercise of the
right .... ,,119
Just as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been
applied to efforts to terminate (or not renew) contracts, it should be applied
to efforts to terminate (or not renew) leases. Nonetheless, the courts that
limited the franchisor's ability to terminate by applying the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing insisted that they were doing so for
franchises and not for leases. 2 ° The "distinction between leases and
franchises pervades the case law, with courts refusing to impose a good
faith obligation in transactions that are labeled leases."''
117. Bell, supra note 8, at 524-25. But see Diamond & Foss, supra note 105, at 587 ("[T]he
covenant applies only when the propriety of the conduct is not resolved by the terms of the
contract or by another default rule."). This is contradicted by some cases and by one of the
persons responsible for creating the doctrine. See Summers, supra note 107, at 198 (stating that
the purpose of the doctrine-and related doctrines-is to "limit and quantify specific legal rules
and contract terms").
118. Bell, supra note 8, at 521-22.
119. Bell, supra note 8, at 523.
120. See Chase & Taylor, supra note 98, at 687.
121. Id. at 686-87 ("[T]he terminability question exists regardless of whether the arrangement
is a lease or a franchise. The vital question would appear to be not whether the arrangement was
a lease or a franchise, but whether any arrangement which specifies a definite term can be
construed to require renewals."). Chase and Taylor conclude
it is clear that if a transaction is categorized as a lease, an automatic and unyielding
consequence attaches. Neither the landlord's right to terminate in accordance with the
terms of the lease nor his right to refuse to renew a lease upon its expiration are
encumbered by a good faith requirement. On the other hand, if the transaction is
classified as a franchise, the termination or nonrenewal right is magically transformed
from one without restriction to one bridled with the requirement of good faith.
Id. at 688. The problem Chase and Taylor identified, publishing in 1985, was that "the modern
lease has not been fully absorbed into general contract law." Id. More than two decades later,
with contract law much more generally applied to leases, the sensible rules developed in the
franchise cases should be applied to leases as well.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

This distinction is analytically unsound. As Chase and Taylor point
out:

The courts adhering to this dubious distinction between leases and
franchises have failed to distinguish between historical and logical
incidents of common law tenancies. If the obligation to deal in good
faith were precluded by common law concepts, then the recent and
widely adopted doctrine of retaliatory eviction would be quite
impossible. That doctrine imposes a negative obligation on the
landlord to avoid dealing in bad faith, which is analytically akin to
the affirmative obligation to deal in good faith, an obligation which
we believe should be generally recognized. It is curious that courts
that have no difficulty requiring the landlord to avoid the one should
have such great difficulty in requiring him to achieve the other.
to deal
Perhaps if courts were to see this connection, the obligation
22
in good faith would lose its apparently alien appearance.1
Indeed, the application of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to terminations of tenancies was analyzed and approved in the
1980s. In her seminal 1982 article, Professor Glendon wrote:
Even without legislation, the case law developments could go quite
far in the direction of limiting the landlord's ability to terminate
tenancies. The increasing disposition of courts to carry new and old
principles of contract law over into residential lease law, together
with the "good faith" clause in URLTA section 1.302, modelled [sic]
on the Uniform Commercial Code's section 1-203, might well result
be much
in holding landlords to a standard of good faith that would
23
broader in scope than the retaliatory eviction concept.1
In her 1985 article, Professor Bell spelled out in detail one way in
which "the obligation of good faith, which is already implied in leases, as it
is in all contracts, should be interpreted by courts to prohibit a landlord's
Professor Bell considers why the good faith obligation has been more readily accepted in
the franchise cases than in the employment cases. She finds three explanations. First, "that
franchising is a relatively recent phenomenon, without the long history and well-established
precedent of at-will termination that exists in the employment context." Second, "the franchisee
did not have to overcome, as did the employee, the still-influential notion of an employer's
'property' right in the employment." And, third, "because the perceived loss to the franchiseeinvestment of money in the business-is strictly economic, courts may be more comfortable
protecting that interest from vindictive action than in the employment cases where losses may be
partly economic and partly non-economic." Bell, supra note 8, at 528. She says that this makes
the argument harder in the landlord-tenant situation because "[t]he landlord-tenant relationship,
like the employment relationship, carries with it long-standing notions of property rights and an
historically recognized right of termination. In addition, the interest of and resulting injury to the
tenant are less directly economic than in the case of the franchisee." Bell, supra note 8, at 528.
122. Chase & Taylor, supra note 98, at 698-99.
123. Glendon, supra note 42, at 542 (footnotes omitted).
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exercise of otherwise permissible termination rights in a bad faith manner
that contravenes the tenant's expectation of continued occupancy."' 24
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can protect
tenants from various kinds of oppressive conduct.'25 Considering only its
application to efforts to terminate tenancies, judges could use the implied
covenant, in appropriate cases, to modify the conditions of the termination
as well as to prevent the termination altogether. Thus, for example, in
appropriate cases, a judge might hold that good faith and fair dealing
requires that a tenant be given a longer period of time in which to move, or
that the landowner be required to provide replacement housing,'26 or that
displacement not be scheduled until the end of a school year, 127 or that
28
displacement not occur during notably hot or cold weather.
124. Bell, supra note 8, at 508; see also id. at 509-10, 520 ("analogizing the move to
implying such obligations in leases to similar shifts in employment cases"). For consideration of
reasons why protection in the home may be even more important than protection in the
workplace, see, for example, Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual
Harassmentat Home, 40 ARtZ. L. REv. 17, 21-28 (1998).
125. Compiling a list of such possibilities is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is not
"good faith and fair dealing" to, for example, lease units that have lead-based paint, lease units
when one does not have required certificates and licenses, or engage in oppressive or harassing
management practices. Any landowner conduct that any advocate would consider objectionable
if applied to herself is a good candidate for being characterized as not "good faith and fair
dealing." It also will be helpful for tenant advocates to draw upon the development of contract
law standards when seeking to apply the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g.,
Diamond & Foss, supra note 105, at 590-600 (discussing various approaches to determining
when conduct is of the kind that violates the covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
126. See Ball, supra note 3, at 57 (stating that in France, "the evicting judge may provide for
the tenant to pay arrears by installments over two years or delay the eviction for up to three years
for reasons including social reasons and the attitude of the tenant"). It is interesting (and
embarrassing to the honor of the United States) to note that, in addition, in France, a
physical eviction can only be carried out by the police for the central state, because it is a
procedure which would normally be a breach of a person's human rights .... Thus the
additional permission of the pr6fet ...is required for the use of public force. This can be
refused, following enquiry, if the tenants will not leave, perhaps because they are
needy.... If permission is refused, the landlord can apply to the administrative tribunals
for compensation from the state, usually equal to the rent.
Ball, supra note 3, at 57. For a requirement of replacement housing, see Ball, supra note 3, at 56
(stating that there is a compulsory departmental plan for re-housing disadvantaged people).
127. See, e.g., Crowley, supra note 9, at 26 (stating that in Houston, Texas, "school officials
negotiated with landlords to use one-year leases that end on June 30 in order to curtail moves
during the school year").
128. See D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01(k) (2001 & Supp. 2007) (prohibiting most evictions "on
any day when the National Weather Service predicts at 8:00 a.m. that the temperature at the
National Airport weather station will fall below 32 degrees Fahrenheit or 0 degrees centigrade
within the next 24 hours"). In addition, "the practice of the [U.S.] Marshals [in the District of
Columbia] is also not to do the eviction if it is raining." E-mail from Julie Becker, Esq., Senior
Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Society of D.C., to Florence Wagman Roisman, William F. Harvey
Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis (Aug. 16, 2007, 13:37 CST)
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With respect to termination vel non, the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing would prohibit termination (or non-renewal) in situations
where the landowner is being malicious or vindictive or is taking undue
advantage of the tenant.
In the franchise cases, for example,
"commentators do agree that the ... good faith obligation is an appropriate
'
vehicle to prohibit opportunistic or vindictive franchisor behavior."129
Case-by-case common law development would be necessary to
illuminate the application of these standards. Professor Bell says, for
example, that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing prohibits
conduct that is "opportunistic."' 30 Discussing the franchise cases, she
writes that "[t]he good faith obligation, while prohibiting vindictive or
coercive termination . . . , does not prevent termination where the
franchisor has a solid business reason for ending the relationship." 3 ' But
the line between "opportunistic" or "coercive" conduct on the one hand,
and "solid business reason[s]," on the other, is not easy to draw. In the
franchise cases, courts found that the covenant was violated when the
franchisor took advantage of his market power.'32 In Julian v. Christopher,
the court held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was
violated when the landlord withheld permission for a sublease apparently in
order to extort a higher rent from the tenants.' 33 This is as appropriately
characterized as "coercive" or "opportunistic" conduct as "good business
judgment." When the owner of a manufactured housing community is able
to make more money by putting the property to some other purpose, is this
opportunism or good business judgment?' 34 If a landlord who is making a
reasonable return on his investment tries to displace long-time tenants into
a tight housing market because he can increase his profit by using the
property for another purpose, is this "opportunism" or "good business
judgment?" These considerations suggest that, pace Professor Bell, there

(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Ball, supra note 3, at 56 (stating that in
France, no evictions are allowed between November 1 and March 15 "in the absence of rehousing").
129. Bell, supra note 8, at 527.
130. Id. at 526-27 (stating that commentators may criticize a good-cause-for-termination
requirement for franchises, but "do agree that the more limited good faith obligation is an
appropriate vehicle to prohibit opportunistic or vindictive franchisor behavior"); id. at 527-28.
131. Id. at 525.
132. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598, 603 (N.J. 1973) (so holding).
133. Id. at 735 (holding that refusal simply to gain higher profits is unreasonable unless the
sublease would lead to additional expenses or higher financial risks for the landlord).
134. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 15, at 388-89 (pointing out, under the heading "Park
Landlords' Potentially Abusive Dominance," that park owners "often push [mobile home owners
to sell their homes at distressed prices to the landlords" and that "the fairness of these purchases
can be suspect in light of a park owner's affiliation with retail outlets").
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are situations in which the covenant of good faith and fair dealing should
prohibit conduct that is motivated by "sound business judgment."
As this discussion shows, an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing that prohibits "opportunistic" conduct by a landowner could
provide substantial protection for tenants faced with termination. Just as
that implied covenant prohibited the landlord in Julian v. Christopherfrom
denying a request for a sublease in order to insist on higher rent, the same
implied covenant should prohibit a landowner from terminating a tenancy
in order sell the land for more money. Depending upon the circumstances,
the latter can be as opportunistic as the former.
There is, however, another way in which the common law offers
tenants protection from arbitrary terminations of tenancies: by application
of an implied covenant requiring good cause for termination. This is
discussed below.
B.

The Implied Covenant of Security of Tenure or Good Causefor
Termination

For the same reasons that common law courts recognized and applied
the implied-in-law warranty of habitability and the implied-in-law covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, courts should recognize and apply an
implied-in-law covenant of secure tenure absent good cause for
termination. The New Jersey Supreme Court did this in Shell Oil Co. v.
Marinello,'35 a case involving a franchise agreement and lease.' 36 In
Marinello, the court held that a "provision giving Shell the absolute right to
terminate on 10 days notice" was void and that the law "read into" the lease
and dealer agreement "the restriction that Shell not have the unilateral right
to terminate, cancel or fail to renew the franchise, including the lease, in
absence of a showing that Marinello has failed to substantially perform his
obligations under the lease and dealer agreement, i.e., for good cause
"1137

This covenant of good cause for termination should be implied into at
least some residential leases just as it was implied into the commercial
lease-plus-franchise-agreement involved in Marinello. The principal basis
for the holding in Marinello applies much more strongly to residential
leases.

135. 307 A.2d 598 (N.J. 1973).
136. Id. at 603; see also Chase & Taylor, supra note 98, at 672 ("[T]he requirement of good
cause as a condition of termination has been imposed in cases involving franchises terminable at
the sole discretion of the franchisor.").
137. Marinello, 307 A.2d at 603.
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In Marinello, the principal basis for the court's implying the good
cause requirement was "the uneven bargaining power of the parties. 138
Inequality of bargaining power is, at best, as often a problem for residential
tenants than for commercial tenants or franchisees, such as those involved
in Marinello. Inequality of bargaining power is a severe problem for
renters today-even more of a problem for renters today than it was when
the implied warranty of habitability was adopted (largely because of
perceived inequality of bargaining power)139 : "Nationwide there are about
9 million renter households with extremely low incomes and only 6.2
million rental units they can afford." 4 ' The burden on poor renters is
especially heavy:
[I]n all years [from 1960 through 2000], the proportion of income
devoted to housing costs is far larger among low-income renters than
among high-income renters. The most extreme rent burdens are
observed for poor households (roughly the bottom 12 percent of
households). In 2000, the median poor renter households devoted 64
percent of income to rent.... Among poor households, 77 percent
devoted more than 30 percent of their incomes to housing costs,
while 57 percent spent over half their incomes for housing.' 4 '

138. Bell, supra note 8, at 525 n.200; see also Glendon, supra note 42, at 512-17 (discussing
Marinello); Murray, supra note 115, at 148-52 (discussing the proposition that "[g]radually, in
recognition of the bias toward the landlord, courts began to exercise equitable power in favor of
the defendant-tenant").
139. See John M. Quigley & Steven Raphael, Is Housing Unaffordable? Why Isn't It More
Affordable?, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 199 (2004) (containing Table 4, below, which shows the
extent to which the percentage of rental stock affordable to poor renters declined from 1960 to
2000. The numbers in parentheses indicate the proportion of renter households that were poor at
each point; these percentages are relatively stable.
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000

13(27)
12(22)
12(22)
9 (22)
4 (23)).

See also id. at 199 (stating that "[t]he proportion of the rental housing stock that is affordable...
to the median renter has declined markedly," especially for poor renters); JOINT CTR. FOR Hous.
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2007, at 22 [hereinafter STATE
OF THE NATION'S HOUSING] (showing that renters are poorer than they have been in the past and
that the "share of renters in the bottom income quartile [increased] from 38 percent in 1995 to 41
percent in 2005").
140. Editorial, Raise the Roofs: A Bill To Construct More Affordable Housing Units, WASH.
POST, July 30, 2007, at A14; see also Quigley & Raphael, supra note 139, at 199-200 (stating
that the evidence "suggest[s] a substantial undersupply of rental dwellings available for lowincome households, even those willing to devote a large fraction of income to rent").
141. See Quigley & Raphael, supra note 139, at 198 (stating that most nonelderly poor and
near-poor households are renters, not homeowners).
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There have been "pronounced increases in the typical rental burdens
for poor and near-poor households"' 42 as "the number of renter households
paying 30 to 50 percent of income on rent has increased by 3 million, and
the number of rental households paying more than 50 percent of income on
rent has increased by another 3.6 million."' 43 Also, a much higher
percentage of minorities than of white Anglos are renters rather than
homeowners;'4" as minorities, they face housing discrimination which
makes rental housing more expensive for them than the housing would be
for white Anglos.'45
Inequality of bargaining power also is a grave problem for owners of
manufactured homes. Many owners of manufactured homes are lowincome people; 4 6 most live in manufactured home communities, and have
"generally weak bargaining power," while the park owners enjoy
47
"[p]otentially [a]busive [d]ominance."'
The inequality of bargaining position and the strong personal and
societal interests in stable occupancy, all discussed in Part I, argue
powerfully for judicial implication of a covenant of security of tenure or
good cause for termination. Since most tenants are unable to secure such

142. Id.at 192, 198 (concluding that the evidence "suggests that inequality in rent burdens
has increased over the past four decades"). Also,
[iln 1960 and 1970, the median renter devoted 20 percent of income to rent. By 1980,
this figure increased to 25 percent, and it subsequently rose slightly. Similar patterns are
observed for the proportion of renter households/ spending greater than 30 percent of
incomes on housing costs, although for this measure, the post-1980 increases are
pronounced.
Id. at 197-98.
143. Id. at 212.
144. Id. at 193 (stating that "there are pronounced racial and ethnic differences in
homeownership rates (for example, the white-black difference in homeownership rates is 26
percentage points)"); see also STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING, supra note 139, at 36 (showing
that the racial gap in homeownership has not changed over the years, though the homeownership
rates have increased).
145. See generally THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN-AMERICAN:
How WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY (2004) (discussing the relationship between race and
inequality); JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS OF
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION (1995) (discussing the relationship between race and housing
discrimination).
146. Schmitz, supra note 15, at 385 (stating that manufactured housing is "an important
source of housing for families that cannot afford to purchase conventional homes, or even to rent
decent apartments" and referring to "the relatively high percentages of low-income and minority
families living in [mobile homes]").
147. Id. at 388; see supra text accompanying note 15 (discussing reasons for the financial
weakness of many owners of manufactured homes).

NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
security by bargaining, the law
48

should provide the

[Vol. 86
security by

implication. 1

Professor Bell, who makes a powerful case for applying to lease
terminations the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, considers
that the implied covenant of good cause for termination "extends beyond
the good faith obligation."' 49 As discussed, she considers that "[t]he good
faith obligation, while prohibiting vindictive or coercive termination of the
franchise, does not prevent termination where the franchisor has a solid
business reason for ending the relationship."'' ° She writes:
In contrast, the good cause limitation permits termination only upon
a showing that the franchisee has breached the agreement or failed to
perform adequately under the contract, thus excluding a right of
termination for business reasons unrelated to franchise performance.
While a franchisor terminating the franchise for business reasons
acts in "good faith," he does not exhibit "good cause."''
Upon this basis, Professor Bell argues that "[j]ust cause requirements
...represent such a drastic departure from the common law rules that

legislative action would be necessary to implement them."' 52 Further

148. A fundamental reason for courts to use implied covenants to impose protections is that
individuals cannot secure those protections for themselves because they lack bargaining power
(or power in the legislature), but the courts consider those obligations essential to protect
important interests of the individuals and of society. See Bell, supra note 8, at 531-32 (showing
that this process of redefining common law rules governing the landlord-tenant relationship to fit
changing societal mores has gone on for centuries). With respect specifically to changing the
rules governing termination, Professor Bell states that
it appears that the common law courts created the periodic tenancy estate to protect
agricultural tenants from the harsh effects of termination under the tenancy at will....
[Since] farmers under tenancies at will could be removed without notice even after
planting their yearly crops[,] ... to protect the tenant's reasonable expectation of security
of tenure for at least a brief period, the yearly periodic tenancy was developed by the
courts.... Similarly, once the periodic tenancy was established, the common law began
to require that the tenancy could only be terminated by giving notice a specified time in
advance of leasehold termination.
Thus, the basic form of the landlord-tenant
relationship that now appears in need of restructuring was itself developed primarily as a
judicial tool for recognizing what were at that time legitimate tenant expectations."
Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 88, at 808 (stating that "residential leases should be subject to
implied terms designed to correct inequities due to bargaining imperfections"). As discussed
supra note 102, I think it problematic to rely on "expectations"; I consider, however, that what
Professor Bell here attributes to expectations appropriately is attributed to strong tenant and
societal interests.
149. Bell, supra note 8, at 525.
150. Id.; see supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
151. Bell, supra note 8, at 525.
152. Id. at 537; see also id. at 507-08 (stating that a good cause requirement would effect "a
complete reversal of the landlord-tenant relationship").
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analysis, however, shows that that despite Professor Bell's objections, there
are persuasive arguments for judicial implication of a good cause
requirement.
As discussed, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not as
narrow as Professor Bell suggests. The distinction between "opportunism"
and "sound business judgment" is hard to draw, and the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing has been used to invalidate decisions made for
business reasons. The franchise termination decisions all were made for
business reasons-to make more profit for the franchisor. The refusal to
allow a sublease in Julian v. Christopherwas made for business reasonsto make more profit for the landlord. In most of the franchise cases and in
Julian v. Christopher and similar cases, nonetheless, the courts held that
the effort to make more money conflicted with the duty of good faith and
fair dealing. Thus, the fact that a covenant may invalidate a decision made
for business reasons is not on its own a justification for requiring that that
covenant be created legislatively." 3
Arguing that legislation is necessary to create a good cause
requirement, Professor Bell states that a just-cause standard "provides the
greatest degree of tenant security, going beyond even the good faith
obligation. Just cause standards basically provide the tenant with a life
estate in the leased property, subject to interruption only for failure to
comply with lease conditions."' 54 Two points need to be made about this.
First, good cause for termination may mean things other than failure to
comply with lease provisions. Second, there is nothing inherently wrong
with assuring a tenant a life estate in a tenancy, subject to certain
conditions: "A lifetime right to possession may appear to be a reasonable

153. Professor Bell's unduly narrow reading of the covenant of good cause and fair dealing is
illuminated by her concluding analysis of the difference between that covenant and the good
cause covenant. Writing about the franchise cases, she says that
[w]hile a franchisor terminating the franchise for business reasons acts in 'good faith,' he
does not exhibit 'good cause.' But the good faith covenant does not require good faith
only; it also requires 'fair dealing,' which has a broader meaning. And when one party

terminates an agreement in order to take advantage of a superior position in the market,
his action may be in 'good faith' but not 'fair dealing.'
Bell, supra note 8, at 525.
154. Id. at 537. Professor Bell also supports her argument that legislative action is needed
because "[i]t stretches the imagination to imply, as a matter of contractual interpretation, that the
parties may reasonably expect that the landlord cannot terminate the lease even for legitimate
business reasons." Id. at 537. We have adverted, supra notes 95 and 140, to the problems with
resolving issues based on expectations. Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Marinello,
said that an agreement that specifically gave Shell the "absolute right to terminate on 10 days
notice" had an implied-by-law requirement that Shell exercise that right only for good cause.
Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598, 603 (N.J. 1973).
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or an extreme construction depending on the circumstances of the
agreement....
[And i]f the lifetime occupancy construction appears
unreasonable under the circumstances, ... [the lease can be] construed to
authorize occupancy by the tenant for a reasonable period."' 55
As to the first, it is true that the New Jersey Supreme Court said in
56
Marinello that good cause means failure to comply with lease provisions.
But "good cause" does not necessarily mean only failure to comply with
lease provisions. It may also mean desire to put the property to personal
use or to use the property for another purpose altogether-purposes that
have been defined as good cause for termination in New Jersey, the District
of Columbia, and elsewhere.'57 In any given situation, it will be up to a
court to consider whether a particular reason does or does not constitute
good cause for termination.
In deciding whether a particular landowner does or does not have
good cause for terminating a tenancy (as in deciding whether a particular
landowner does or does not act in good faith or engage in fair dealing when
terminating a tenancy), a court will take into account a variety of factors.
Among many other factors, the court will consider the relative financial
situations of the landowner and the tenant-some landowners are wealthy,
powerful, national or international mega-businesses, and some are
individual, "mom-and-pop" landlords.'58
Some tenants are wealthy,
although most are low-income and many also are minorities. ' 9 The court
will consider how tight the housing market is, implying more protections
155. Chase & Taylor, supra note 98, at 674. For example, the tenancy could be permitted to
continue until the end of a school year or for long enough to allow the tenant to secure alternative
housing.
156. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598 at 600.
157. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1-61.12 (West 2000); D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01
(2001) (setting out what constitutes good cause for eviction). The D.C. Rental Housing Act of
1985 sets forth ten conditions that constitute good cause for eviction: nonpayment of rent, breach
of the lease, commission of a crime on the premises, personal use and occupancy by the landlord
or a buyer, vacancy-required renovations, substantial rehabilitation, discontinuance of housing
use, demolition, and conversion to condominium or cooperative status. Only the first three are
related to tenant conduct. See D.C. CODE § 3505.01(a)-(k) (2001).
158. See STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2007, supra note 139, at 21 ("In 2001,
individuals and married couples owned 19.3 million of the nation's rental units, while
partnerships, corporations, and other institutions owned another 15.6 million ....
Individuals
and couples are more likely to own smaller properties, holding 84 percent of the rental properties
with 1-4 units and 65 percent of those with 5-19 units."); see also id. at 22 (stating that
individuals and couples "tend to own older properties and charge lower rents" and that these
owners "may face low or negative net operating incomes." Their properties may be appreciating
in value.) The solution to the problems of these small landlords, however, is not to be found in
burdening their tenants; as the authors of STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2007, supra note
139, conclude, "[t]he fate of the affordable housing supply therefore relies critically on finding
ways to assist these small property owners in preserving their rental buildings," id. at 22.
159. See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
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for tenants when a tight housing market indicates that the tenants have little
or no bargaining power."
Courts also will consider the kinds of factors that would be relevant to
the application of the equitable doctrines that were discussed above, such
as the length of time the tenant had occupied the premises, investments the
tenant may have made in the property, the landowner's past policy with
respect to continued occupancy, the hardship that displacement would
cause the tenant, any representations the landowner might have made with
respect to continued occupancy, and the number of times the tenancy had
been renewed in the past.'6'
Certainly, one of the factors the court will consider in applying either
of these implied covenants is the landlord's purpose in seeking to terminate
the tenancy. If the landlord's purpose is vindictive or opportunistic, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing would apply. Even if the landlord
has a "sound business reason" for the termination, either the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing or the covenant of good cause for eviction might
apply. The fact that a landlord desires to transfer a property to his own
personal use does not necessarily overwhelm the tenant's and societal
interests in continued occupancy.'62 The fact that a landowner can make
more money by transforming the property to another use does not
necessarily overwhelm the tenant's and societal interests in continued
occupancy.
It certainly is not the case that a landowner is entitled to do whatever
will produce the highest profit for him. Thus, for example, a landlord
could make more money if he did not pay for maintenance, but housing
codes and the implied warranty of habitability forbid that. A landlord may
be able to make more money if he limits his tenancy to white people, but
the law does not allow him to do that. A landlord could make more money
if he did not have to make reasonable accommodations for tenants with
disabilities, but the law does not allow him to do that. Shell Oil Company
presumably considered that it could make more profit if it terminated the
franchise agreement with Mr. Marinello, but the court held that did not
constitute good cause for termination.63 Similarly, what a landowner
160. Bargaining power between the parties may vary with location-in some markets,
landlords may have far more power than in others. See STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2007,
supra note 139, at 20 (noting that, in the West, 2006 marked "the third straight year of vacancy
rate reductions" and "rents in the West rose more than twice as fast as in any other region").
Vacancy rates also fell in the South and Midwest, but rose in the Northeast. Id.
161. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
162. See Barreto v. Portugal, 334 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at I1 (1995).
163. The New Jersey Supreme Court said that Mr. Marinello "attributed his present
difficulties with Shell to his refusal to accede to Shell's request that he lower his price from 3
cents to 5 cents a gallon during an area 'gas war' . . .. He also said that he was told ... that one
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considers the exercise of sound business judgment may not be consistent
with the requirements of good faith and fair dealing. In each case, the court
will weigh the competing interests and make an appropriate judgment."6
To some extent, the impact of such a rule will be to make private
ownership of rental housing for low income people less attractive than it is
now, but to the extent that such ownership is attractive because landlords
can oppress the tenants, such ownership should be made unattractive. The
provision of decent, affordable housing for poor people is not an area for
private enterprise. It is a government responsibility, and the government
should not evade this obligation by allowing private landowners to cheat
tenants and society of what they need.' 65
CONCLUSION

Current landlord-tenant law with respect to security of tenure imposes
a per se rule-no matter how strong the tenant's and societal interests in
continued occupancy or how weak the landlord's interest in termination,
the landlord's interest will prevail unless the tenant has bargaining power,
save for a few relatively narrow situations dealt with by specific doctrines
such as retaliatory eviction or anti-discrimination standards. Current law
provides no general recognition of the tenant's or societal interest in
security of tenure, simply a prohibition of specific motivations for
termination. Applying the doctrines discussed in this Article would simply
extend to the situation of tenancy termination the principle that a
landowner's interest in how he handles his property is not absolutely
privileged; it is to be judged in balance with the interests of the tenant and
society in general.

of the reasons his lease was not being renewed was he did not buy enough TBA (tires, batteries,
and accessories)." Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A,2d 598, 602-03 (N.J. 1973).
164. When good cause for termination is required but there is no rent control legislation,
courts will have to make judgments about whether proposed rent increases are appropriate, given
the balance of landowner, tenant, and societal interests. Rent increases that are attempts to
circumvent the good faith or good cause requirement would have to be prohibited to protect the
integrity of the good faith or good cause requirement. Courts make similar judgments now in
such areas, see Aimco Props., L.L.C. v. Dziewisz, 883 A.2d 310, 313 (N.H. 2005), and in
situations where rent increases are challenged as retaliation for protected activities or having a
prohibited discriminatory purpose or effect. In Connecticut, the good-cause-for-termination
requirement is protected by an explicit, legislative requirement that any proposed rent increase be
"fair and equitable." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-23c(b)(1)(B) (1999), listing as a good cause for
termination "refusal to agree to a fair and equitable rent increase, as defined in subsection (c) of
this section." The criteria in § 7-148c include tenant hardship. Id. § 7-148c(9).
165. See STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2007, supra note 139, at 22; Glendon, supra note
42, at 575 (stating that "[b]y promoting the illusion that the problem of housing the poor can be
resolved within the private rental sector, [landlord-tenant law reforms] are further evidence of our
collective inability to 'come to grips' with an aspect of the problem of poverty").
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Imposing an implied-by-law requirement of good cause for
termination of a tenancy, including non-renewal of a tenancy, is not a
radical step and will not cause destruction of the residential rental market.
The feasibility of a good cause for termination rule is demonstrated
unequivocally by the experience in the jurisdictions that require good cause
for termination of tenancies for owners of manufactured housing and
others, notably the District of Columbia and New Jersey, the latter of which
"has had statewide 'good cause' statutory eviction/lease renewal
protections since 1974. '66
Just as with the implied warranty of habitability, and the application of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to franchise
terminations, these statutory requirements should be taken into account by
the courts in redressing the imbalance in power between tenants and
landlords and taking account of the powerful interests of tenants and
society in assuring security of tenure for those who rent their homes or the
land on which their homes are sited.

166. E-mail from Kenneth Goldman, Senior Attorney, South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., to
Housing Justice Network (June 16, 2005, 14:51 PST) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). The State of New Jersey Housing Policy and Status Report, issued on August 10, 2006,
does not include in a list of "housing providers' concerns" any reference to the good-cause-foreviction requirement; indeed, there is no reference to that requirement in the report. THE STATE
OF NEW JERSEY HOUSING POLICY AND STATUS REPORT 41-42 (2006), http://www.state.nj.us/
dca/housingpolicy06.pdf.
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